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This case study of Venezuela’s democratic institution and policymaking processes 
is part of the broader regional project based on the theoretical framework 
developed by Spiller, Stein and Tommasi (2003). The framework focuses on the 
conditions that foster political cooperation among political actors to sustain inter-
temporal policy commitments. The study shows that the political institutions that 
established Venezuela’s democracy in the 1960s were deliberately set up to 
generate a cooperative equilibrium with low stakes of power. Constitutionally 
weak presidents and strong centralized political parties characterized this 
institutional framework. Cooperation induced a relatively effective policymaking 
process and good policy outcomes. However, an oil boom and its aftermath, in the 
1970s and 1980s, unraveled the cooperative framework and induced rapid 
economic decay. The political reforms implemented in the late 1980s to improve 
the democratic process, although in itself desirable, further weakened the party 
system and induced a highly uncooperative and volatile policymaking process. 
The recent political reforms, increasing the stakes of power, have stimulated a 
complete breakdown in cooperation and a highly polarized political system. 
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  41. Introduction 
 
Venezuela’s democratic history, from 1958 to 2004, offers a striking case study of political 
institutions and policymaking processes. It used to be the model stable democracy in the troubled 
Latin American region, but in the last decade it has become one of the least stable and most 
polarized. It used to have one of the best regional economic performances, but has had one of the 
worst performances in the last 25 years. Recent studies attribute a significant part of Venezuela’s 
economic decline to the dramatic reduction in per-capita oil income and the increasing volatility 
of oil prices (Hausmann and Rigobón, 2002; Manzano and Rigobón, 2001; Rodríguez and Sachs, 
1999). Political instability and a decline in the quality of policymaking might explain why 
Venezuela has not returned to a development path, but they cannot explain the size of the initial 
fall (which was largely an exogenous outcome). 
The research project to which this case study belongs evaluates how political institutions 
have influenced policymaking processes and how in turn the latter influenced the features of 
public policy outcomes. It is structured under the theoretical framework advanced by Spiller, 
Stein and Tommasi (2003), focusing on the conditions that generate political cooperation among 
political actors to sustain inter-temporal policy commitments. Environments in which there are 
few relevant players, repeated interaction among them, and small discount rates would tend to 
produce long-term cooperation among the key players. As a result, first-best policies would tend 
to be stable across administrations and only change significantly in response to economic 
shocks.
2 Moreover, according to the framework, cooperative policymaking processes would tend 
to produce policies with good outer-features such as stability, coherence, public regardedness 
and flexibility. But as will be argued in the concluding remarks, the Venezuelan case shows that 
cooperation does not necessarily imply all the good features mentioned. 
This paper shows how the political institutions that established Venezuela’s democracy 
induced a remarkably cooperative policymaking process, which generated relatively stable 
policies. However, the decline in performance prompted by the fall in oil revenue and the 
institutional and economic reforms that were implemented to deal with it weakened the 
cooperative incentive structure. As a result, policies became more volatile and shortsighted. 
                                                 
2 In order to understand the nature and objectives of this case study, it would be advisable to read the theoretical 
papers upon which the regional projects are based: Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi (2003) and Oliveira and Scartascini 
(2003). 
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variables and their behavior in Venezuela: 
 
1) Economic and Social Performance 
This project does not directly study the determinants of economic performance. As argued 
before, the policymaking processes and the policy features only partially determine economic 
performance. Other variables such as exogenous economic or political shocks may have as much 
explanatory value. As a result, economic and social indicators only give us indirect evidence 
about the dependent variable, i.e., the outer features of public policy outcomes. In the country 
case of Venezuela, this distinction is particularly relevant since economic performance (as well 
as the other variables) is significantly affected by the presence of a key exogenous variable: oil 
income. 
The stylized evolution of economic performance under democratic rule in Venezuela has 
been:  
•  From 1958 to 1978: good economic performance, high growth, low inflation, 
decreasing poverty, and low unemployment.  
•  From 1978 to 2004: dismal economic performance, worst per-capita GDP 
performance in Latin America, high inflation, increasing unemployment, and 
increasing poverty. 
2) The Features of Public Policy Outcomes 
Features of public policy outcomes such as stability, flexibility, coherence, public favor, and 
building of policy capacities are desirable because they tend to contribute to development. 
According to a variety of indicators, public policies in Venezuela in the last two decades can be 
generally characterized as having very low quality. For example, the World Bank Institute 
indicators placed Venezuela among the lowest regional positions on governance quality. 
Although we do not have comparative data on the first three decades of democracy (1958-1988), 
the evidence reviewed seems to suggest that the quality of public policies was significantly better 
and has tended to deteriorate.  
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periods: 
•  In most policy areas the period 1958-1973 seems to present the best public policy 
features: stability, coherence, some building of policy capabilities. 
•  The period 1973-1988 is characterized by a decline in some public policy features, 
the unraveling of some policy processes, and inefficiency in certain areas. However, 
in some key areas (e.g. oil industry, central bank), the relative good quality of public 
policy was preserved.  
•  The period 1989-2004 is characterized by a progressive and dramatic deterioration of 
most public policy features: volatility, incoherence, and disinvestment in policy 
capabilities. There were significant attempts to reverse these trends and some 
excellent technocratic teams implemented successful reforms in specific areas (oil 
opening, privatizations), but political instability and lack of state capacity did not 
allow them to bear significant fruits. 
3) The Characteristics of the Policymaking Process 
Two periods with significantly different characteristics can be identified: 
•  The first period from 1958 to 1988 is generally characterized by an institutionalized 
cooperative process, low number of key players, and repeated interaction. It was the 
result of the consolidation of a centralized and concentrated party system, with 
disciplined parties, low fragmentation, low volatility, a marginal Legislature, and 
controlled delegation by party leaders to a predominant Executive. 
•  The second period from 1989 to 2004 is generally characterized by the decline and 
eventual breakdown of cooperation, a volatile process, and many fragmented and 
polarized actors. Among the new key actors are the military (two coup attempts), civil 
society groups, and the regional authorities. The last sub-period, President Chávez’s 
administration (1999-2004), has brought a dramatic acceleration of political 
confrontation and partisan policymaking.  
  74) The Institutional Foundations 
Three periods with different institutional frameworks can be distinguished: 
•  The 1958-1988 period of the Pact of Punto Fijo and the 1961 Constitution is 
characterized by the existence of low stakes of power, a constitutionally weak but 
informally powerful president (control of oil rents, appointment of governors) and an 
electoral system with incentives for centralized disciplined parties (closed lists, no 
regional elections).  
•  The 1988-1998 period is characterized by weak presidents, regional elections, 
incentives for political fragmentation and a decline in party discipline. In this period, 
institutional and political instability were the norm. 
•  The 1999-2004 period of the Chavez Revolution and the 1999 Constitution is 
characterized by high stakes of power, a constitutionally powerful president, extreme 
concentration of power and a weakening of checks and balances. 
5) Oil Dependence and Oil Shocks 
Venezuela has been oil dependent since the 1930s, developing a particular political economy in 
which the state is financed largely by oil revenue. The dramatic importance of oil performance 
makes it very difficult to control for the effect of this variable in the analysis. The evolution of 
oil revenue during the democratic period can be stylized as: 
•  1958-1973: decline in real oil prices, increase in oil taxes and output, progressive 
increase in oil fiscal revenue. 
•  1973-1982: oil price boom, fiscal revenue explodes, volatile oil revenue. 
•  1983-2002: declining oil price tendency, volatile oil revenue. 
 
For analytical purposes we established the periods of analysis based on the behavior of 
the independent variables (i.e. institutional foundations). However, in the analytical narrative we 
identify additional sub-periods marked by how the behavior of the exogenous variables affected 
other variables. 
  81.1 A Stylized Story 
The power-sharing Pact of Punto Fijo, the institutions of the 1961 Constitution, and the search 
for stability guided the period of 1958-1973. The institutional foundations generated low stakes 
of power, induced a generally cooperative policymaking process and relatively good policy 
features. The system privileged stability over flexibility or efficiency. Distribution of oil revenue 
was a key element. The system evolved into a cartel-like political arrangement. Economic 
performance was good in part due to a mildly favorable external environment (stability, 
progressively increasing oil revenue). 
In 1973-1982, the oil booms created significant distortions in the political system and the 
economy. It made the Executive more powerful, increased the stakes of power, and stimulated 
deviations from cooperation. Abundance increased incentives for inefficiency and corruption. As 
a result, cooperation declined and the quality of policy suffered significantly. The dramatic oil 
price fall in the 1983-1988 period induced rapid economic decline and political disenchantment. 
Nevertheless, in the 1973-1988 period, the basic policymaking rules and the institutional 
foundations still remained relatively stable. The cartel-like features of the two-party system were 
exacerbated. The system became closed and rigid. Some of the same features that helped regime 
survival and policy stability in the first decade started generating bad and rigid public policies. 
Political (and economic) reforms were begun in 1989. Combined with a significant 
change in voter preferences—a product of the previous poor economic performance—they 
resulted in the deconsolidation of the political system. Fragmentation and volatility became the 
norm. Policymaking became non-cooperative. The outer features of public policy deteriorated 
even though some efficient market reforms were introduced. Instability decreased the likelihood 
of establishing a new cooperative arrangement. The Chavez Revolution prompted the total 
deconsolidation of the party system. Cooperation broke down completely. The new institutions 
increased the stakes of power and made cooperation very costly. The quality of policy features 
seems to be at the lowest level in democratic history. 
1.2 Road Map 
This study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an historical background of the 
institutional origins and transformations that Venezuela’s democratic system has faced from 
1958-2004. Section 3 presents the characteristics of the policymaking process in the first period 
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period (1989-2004) and its institutional foundations. Section 5 describes the outer features of 
Venezuela’s public policy outcomes. Case studies of four policy areas are analyzed to help 
characterize these outer features. 
2. The Rise and Decline of Venezuela’s Democratic Party System 
Venezuela’s first democratic experience in the twentieth century (1945-1948), known as the 
trienio adeco, was short-lived. In 1945, the Acción Democrática (AD) became the ruling party 
with the help of military groups that ousted President Isaías Medina, and called for democratic 
elections that it won with a large margin. However, the same military groups that helped it rise to 
power deposed the AD government in 1948. The party had alienated many powerful groups by 
its hegemonic way of ruling. Opposition parties, the Church, and business groups generally 
supported the coup. A 10-year military dictatorship followed, in which AD was proscribed and 
its members were exiled, prosecuted, and some assassinated. In 1958, the dictator Gen. Marcos 
Pérez Jiménez was overthrown by a military and popular uprising and democracy was reinstated.   
2.1  The Pact of Punto Fijo 
The transition to democracy in 1958-1961 was consolidated under a set of institutional 
arrangements based on a multiparty elite agreement called the Pact of Punto Fijo. The pact was 
agreed upon by the leaders of the three main political parties, Rómulo Betancourt of the social-
democratic AD, Rafael Caldera of the Christian-democratic COPEI, and Jóvito Villalba of the 
center-left-nationalist URD. The contents of the pact included arrangements for power sharing, 
such as the distribution of Cabinet positions among competing parties, and the implementation of 
basic common social and economic policies regardless of the presidential and legislative 
electoral outcomes. In addition, the pact stipulated the need to create corporatist mechanisms that 
guaranteed that labor unions and business interests, through umbrella organizations such as CTV 
and Fedecamaras, respectively, would be consulted and incorporated into the policymaking 
process. The Catholic Church also supported the pact by signing an ecclesiastic agreement with 
the State in which it committed itself to help moderate conflicts and was guaranteed public 
financing. 
The nature and consequences of the two democratic constitutional moments of 1947 and 
1961 clearly reveal the different correlation of forces that prevailed and the learning process that 
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call for an elected Constitutional Assembly. It received 78 percent of the vote and 86 percent of 
the seats and used its absolute dominance to impose a constitution very close to its preferences, 
alienating many relevant actors. But by 1958, the AD’s dominance had declined. Betancourt 
(AD) won the presidency, but this time the party received 49.5 percent of the votes and 55 
percent of the seats in Congress (chamber of deputies). Based on the spirit of pact making, the 
1961 Constitution was crafted by a special congressional committee co-chaired by Raul Leoni 
(AD) and Rafael Caldera (COPEI). Party leaders decided that regardless of the electoral outcome 
of the congressional elections, the committee would be balanced. It included eight 
representatives from the AD (36.4 percent), four from the COPEI, four from the URD, three 
from the Communist Party (PCV) and three independents (Kornblith, 1991). AD leaders agreed 
that the composition of the constitutional committee would over-represent the opposition. As 
Corrales (2003) has recently argued, the result of this decision was “a constitution designed to 
prevent single party hegemony.”  
The pact had an enduring impact on the type of presidential system adopted by the 1961 
Constitution, which was aimed at limiting presidential powers, diminishing political polarization, 
restricting electoral competition, and creating political institutions that would foster consensus 
for conflict resolution (Rey, 1972). The learning experience from the breakdown of Venezuela’s 
democracy in 1948 allowed political parties to understand the importance of designing 
institutions to mitigate the stakes of holding power (Rey, 1989). According to Penfold (2001), 
political leaders explicitly crafted the pact as an institutional arrangement to modify the payoff 
structure of the game to induce cooperation. The rules, reflected formally in the 1961 
Constitution, were basically aimed at creating trust among the different political actors so that 
even in the case of a unified government in which a political party had control of both the 
presidency and Congress, formal political institutions would not allow governments to pursue 
one-sided policies based on this dominant position.  
The Punto Fijo pact was also designed as a means of excluding certain political actors, 
such as the Communist Party (PCV), from having a significant role in policymaking. The pact 
signatories believed it was necessary to exclude the communists in order to provide the United 
States and the private sector with sufficient guarantees that Venezuela was clearly aligned with a 
capitalist system in the context of the Cold War. This situation induced the PCV, as well as the 
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during the 1960s and came to an end in the early 1970s with the pacification process and the re-
entry of the left into the electoral arena. During Betancourt’s presidency, in addition to the leftist 
guerrillas, the emerging democracy also faced two important military coup attempts, one 
presidential assassination attempt, and other less significant attacks. These threats to democracy 
helped to strengthen the cooperation between the participants in the pact. Once the external 
threat vanished in the early 1970s, deviations from cooperation were more common. 
As will be developed in the next section, several specific features of Venezuela’s 
presidential system helped to lower the stakes of power and to induce cooperative behavior 
among competing politicians. Some key institutional features strengthened parties over 
presidents: 1) a constitutionally weak presidency, with limited legislative prerogatives, 2) the ban 
on immediate presidential re-election, forcing incumbents to wait 10 years before being able to 
run again, and 3) the absence of term limits for legislators, allowing long-term careers for party 
leaders in Congress. Setting fully concurrent elections between presidents and the Legislature 
induced cooperation between presidents and their partisan ranks, and reduced party 
fragmentation. Another feature that reduced the stakes of power and induced cooperation among 
parties was the constitutional provision establishing a proportional representation system to elect 
the Legislature. This feature guaranteed that minority parties would gain access to seats in 
Congress. These rules, along with the existence of centralized and disciplined political parties, 
such as the AD and COPEI, helped consolidate Venezuela’s party system throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s. The existence of centralized and disciplined political parties was to a large extent the 
direct result of a proportional electoral system with closed lists. This system granted party 
leaders extreme powers to control and discipline their party ranks. These features of Venezuela’s 
democracy led some authors to typify it as a partyarchy, given that party leaders had supreme 
command over all party and public affairs (Coppedge, 1994).  
Finally, the Constitution limited electoral competition by temporarily restricting the 
direct election of governors and mayors. The objective of limiting Venezuela’s federalism—
provisionally, since the 1961 Constitution established that a law (enacted by two-thirds of 
Congress) could activate Venezuela’s federalism, as later occurred in 1989—was reduce 
electoral competition by restricting the number of arenas open to contestation (Penfold, 2003). 
The dominant political parties believed that increasing electoral competition at a moment of 
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cooperation among political actors (Penfold, 2002) However, as different authors have noted, 
although the features limiting competition in the 1961 Constitution contributed to the 
consolidation of democracy in the short-term, they proved in the medium and long run to have 
negative consequences from both the political and social points of view (Karl, 1986; De la Cruz, 
1998). By limiting political competition, the Pact of Punto Fijo and the Constitution planted the 
roots of a democracy characterized by its centralization and exclusion. It was only in the 1990s 
that Venezuela’s federalism was activated, contributing to the decline of the traditional party 
structure (Penfold, 2002). 
In addition to institutional design, party leaders used the distribution of oil fiscal 
resources as a key element for inducing political cooperation. Various authors have discussed the 
relationship between oil revenue and their effect on the party system (Karl, 1986; Rey, 1989; 
Penfold, 2001; Monaldi, 2002). For example, Karl (1986) argued that oil was the key economic 
factor that helped create the modern social conditions for the formation of a cohesive party 
system, and helps explain the continued support for the pact that solidified the democratic 
transition. According to this argument, without oil there would have been little chance for 
democracy in Venezuela at the time. Other works have given relatively less importance to oil 
revenue, emphasizing the institutional aspects of Venezuela’s democratic process (Rey, 1989). 
By themselves, oil fiscal revenue could not explain the origin of institutional arrangements such 
as the Punto Fijo pact. Instead, political leaders strategically used oil income distribution as a 
utilitarian mechanism to obtain support for the democratic system. According to both viewpoints, 
it should not be a surprise that the decline of the Punto Fijo party system coincided with a 
general decline in oil fiscal income during the 1980s and 1990s (Penfold, 2001). 
The low-stakes institutional framework allowed the country to avoid the authoritarian 
fate of most other oil exporters. Oil income was distributed to key political actors regardless of 
who was in control of the presidency. In addition, rising oil income allowed for increasing 
spending on public goods that promoted growth. Presidents Rómulo Betancourt (1958-1963), 
Raul Leoni (1964-1969) and Rafael Caldera (1970-1974), used oil revenue responsibly, with 
significantly positive economic and social results. Oil resources were heavily invested in the 
creation of national education and national health care systems. Significant resources were also 
directed towards building infrastructure. According to Hausmann (1995), economic growth 
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responsible fiscal policy. Like other countries in the region, Venezuela pursued an import 
substitution strategy with the strong participation of the public sector. The state financed private 
sector initiatives and engaged in the urban transformation of certain regional poles. Despite the 
strong interventionist bent that this economic model had, fiscal policy remained conservative. 
2.2  The Curse of Oil Booms  
It was only when the first oil windfall appeared in 1973 that fiscal policy started to be relaxed. 
Policy discussions revolved around the best manner to invest the fiscal surplus. During the 
presidency of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1974-1979), expenditure in existing state companies 
increased dramatically, new state owned companies were created, and the level of foreign debt 
started to rise exponentially. By 1976, the government was running a fiscal deficit that reached 
14 percent of GDP, forcing the subsequent Herrerra administration (1979-1984) to implement a 
fiscal adjustment. Nevertheless, a few months after the Herrera’s inauguration, another oil 
windfall allowed the government to abandon the adjustment program and instead increase 
expenditures. In 1983, oil prices declined significantly, and as a consequence, a large deficit in 
the current account pressured the government and forced the Central Bank to devalue and 
abandon the fixed exchange rate to adopt a multiple rate system. The Central Bank lost more 
than $10 billion in international reserves. This crisis hampered economic growth and initiated a 
deep recession that lasted almost three years. New fiscal adjustments were introduced and 
protectionist policies were tightened (Hausmann, 1995).  
President Lusinchi (1984-1988) believed that the negative oil shocks were not permanent 
and that significant economic reforms could be postponed. As a result, by 1988 the fiscal deficit 
reached 9.9 percent of GDP and net international reserves reached their lowest point. Price 
controls were causing serious shortages of basic foods, and inventory accumulation started to 
grow as private agents believed that a massive devaluation had to be adopted. This situation 
proved a serious challenge for Pérez (1989-1993), who had won his second presidency in 1989 
under a similar populist platform. Forced by the circumstances, he decided to implement a 
radical adjustment program.  
This attempt to introduce market economic reforms and its consequences, particularly the 
significant opposition launched by the president’s own party (AD), will be explained below. 
However, it is important to emphasize the impact that the poor economic performance from 
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that were adopted to confront discontent, such as the activation of the federal system and the 
reform of the electoral system. During the 1980s, Venezuela became one the worst examples of 
economic underperformance in Latin America. Between 1978 and 1988, GDP per capita 
decreased at an average of 1.8 percent per year. This poor performance started to undermine 
voter confidence in parties such as the AD and COPEI. Many voters began to perceive the state 
as being captured by rent-seeking politicians who did not represent their interests.  
 
2.3 The Sources of Political Reforms 
Beginning in the early 1980s, several social actors, minority parties, intellectuals, business 
groups, and NGOs demanded to deepen democratization as a means of increasing accountability 
and improving performance. These demands were a natural reaction to a regime in which 
political parties had pervasively controlled almost all important spheres of social life. National 
party leaders had a monopoly on the nominations of candidates to the national Legislature as 
well as to the state and municipal assemblies; they appointed judges according to party loyalty; 
and they exercised strong discipline over their members (Coppedge, 1994). More importantly, 
until 1989, regional and local politics had been absent in Venezuela’s democracy. Presidents had 
the right to appoint governors and the mayoral position did not previously exist. Governorships 
were assigned to members of the political party in power and were used as instruments to foster 
patronage (Geddes, 1994). 
President Lusinchi (1984-1989) recognized the need to introduce a series of institutional 
reforms to help solve Venezuela’s political accountability problems. He created a Presidential 
Commission for the Reform of the State (COPRE) consisting of professionals linked to the 
political parties as well as a group of non-partisan academics. The COPRE proposed a significant 
set of political reforms, including the direct election of governors and mayors, electoral reform to 
elect a portion of the legislators by plurality, and the democratization of party structures. These 
propositions met with immediate resistance from the AD (the president’s party), which had an 
absolute majority in the legislature. It thought that the COPRE recommendations were too 
radical. Gonzalo Barrios, AD’s president, publicly rejected the reforms, particularly the direct 
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3 
The AD was not willing to withdraw its control over the patronage network that regional and 
local bureaucracies offered the party. The AD’s national party leaders perceived the COPRE 
propositions to be directly aimed at undermining their political power. As a result, the reforms 
were not even discussed in Congress.  
It was only during the 1988 presidential campaign that the AD’s national party leaders 
were forced to pass some of these reforms due to the attention that the candidates Eduardo 
Fernández of COPEI and Carlos Andrés Pérez of AD paid to these issues. Pérez had won the 
party nomination against the fierce opposition of AD national party leaders, and he wanted to 
weaken their centralized control of the party. Fernández used the reforms as a campaign tool 
against the AD, which had been publicly opposed to any opening of the political process, 
possibly expecting that the AD would continue blocking the reforms. Pérez’s campaign in favor 
of the reforms forced the AD to approve some of them in Congress: the election of mayors and 
the electoral reform to be implemented in 1993. But the election of governors, which the AD 
feared the most, did not pass.  
Eventually, the AD was prompted to support the election of governors as a consequence 
of massive riots that occurred one month after Perez’s inauguration.
 The outburst took place in 
eight major cities and began as spontaneous protests against an increase in public transportation 
fares, which were brought about by a hike in the price of gasoline (Rodríguez, 1996). The 
country was left in absolute despair after this social commotion. Although most of the blame was 
placed on Pérez’s reform program, politicians realized that citizens had increasingly become 
alienated from the democratic regime and this was violently expressed in the streets.  
2.4  Economic Reforms, Backlash, and Reversal 
Although the AD’s national party leaders finally accepted political reforms, they were still 
resistant to economic reforms. Forced by the economic conditions, Pérez launched a 
macroeconomic stabilization program that included the elimination of exchange, interest rate, 
and price controls; a large devaluation; and a significant reduction of the fiscal deficit. The 
program went even further to include trade liberalization, privatization, fiscal and financial 
reforms, and the deregulation of the economy (Naím, 1993; Villasmil et al., 2004). 
                                                 
3 El Universal, June 26, 1986. 
  16The AD’s leadership was not receptive to such a program because it implied dismantling 
the patronage structure under which the party had built its political base. The AD also rejected 
the idea that technocrats, with no linkages to the party, would be made responsible for the 
implementation of these economic policies. Moreover, Pérez was at the time a party outsider and 
had proven in his first presidency that he did not like to follow the party’s commands. The AD’s 
opposition did not allow the government to pass legislation crucial for the reform program, such 
as the Value Added Tax. However, the government managed to use its executive authority to 
open the capital account, liberalize trade, eliminate price controls, and privatize some state 
owned enterprises. Despite political opposition to the reforms, by early 1992 Venezuela was 
attracting large amounts of FDI, and the GDP was growing at an annual rate of more than 8 
percent (Corrales, 2002; Villasmil et al., 2004).  
Despite these economic successes, popular discontent continued and the government still 
had a low approval rating. In February 1992, a group of middle rank officers, commanded by Lt. 
Col. Hugo Chávez, attempted a military coup. The coup failed, but a significant proportion of the 
population justified it, eroding political support for the government. After a second failed coup 
attempt, in early 1993, the AD decided to go along with other political parties and allow the 
impeachment of Pérez for misuse of public funds.  
Congress elected Senator Ramón J. Velásquez as interim president until elections were 
held at the end of 1993. Velásquez had accepted the presidency under the condition that he 
would be able to pass some reforms in Congress to cope with the difficult economic and political 
situation. The government was facing a large fiscal deficit thanks to a new decline in oil revenue 
and so the Value Added Tax was finally approved. 
In 1993, Rafael Caldera, after leaving the COPEI, won the presidency again without the 
support of the traditional political parties, setting the stage for a dramatic transformation of party 
politics in Venezuela. Caldera managed to capitalize on the popular discontent with the AD and 
COPEI and partially on the market economic reforms pursued by Pérez. Although Caldera did 
not explicitly support Chavez’s coup attempt, he justified Chavez’s behavior by arguing that the 
political parties had abandoned the people and were being transformed into corrupt structures. 
During his administration (1994-1999), Caldera faced a fragmented legislature, making it 
difficult for the executive branch to pass legislation. The first part of Caldera’s administration 
witnessed the stagnation and reversal of some reforms (e.g., exchange rate and price controls 
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economic reform program that included an important devaluation and the opening of the oil 
sector. Despite a recovery in 1997, the administration’s popularity remained very low, paving the 
way for the emergence of Hugo Chávez as a viable political alternative.   
2.5  The Chávez Revolution 
In his presidential campaign of 1998, Chávez promised to call a Constituent Assembly to craft a 
completely new constitution and overthrow the Punto Fijo establishment. Like Caldera, Chávez 
won the presidency capitalizing on the increasing discontent with the AD and COPEI. He faced 
an opposition majority in an even more fragmented Congress than did Caldera, making it very 
difficult to pass constitutional reforms in the manner prescribed by the 1961 Constitution. So 
Chávez decided to bypass the Constitution and sign an executive decree to call for a popular 
referendum on this issue. The decree, although protested by the majority in Congress, was a few 
weeks later ratified by the Supreme Court, which ordered some modifications.  
Unlike the Punto Fijo pact and the 1961 Constitutional Commission, Chávez restored the 
hegemonic practice of the AD during the failed democratic experience of 1945-1948, changing 
the institutional framework in a unilateral manner without negotiating with other parties 
(Corrales, 2003). In early 1999, more than 90 percent of the electorate voted in favor of holding 
elections for a Constituent Assembly with plenipotentiary powers. To elect this Assembly, a 
majoritarian electoral system was used instead of the proportional system prescribed by the 
prevailing constitution. The result was a huge over-representation of Chavez supporters. Given 
the lack of coordination and fragmentation of the opposition, in July 1999 Chávez’s coalition 
managed to obtain 96 percent of the seats with less than 60 percent of the vote. This 
overwhelming majority approved a constitution that increased presidential prerogatives and in 
general the stakes of holding power. The Constituent Assembly disbanded the Congress elected 
the previous year and called for elections for a new unicameral Legislature. It also appointed a 
new Supreme Tribunal, Comptroller General, Attorney General, and Ombudsman. Under these 
conditions, opposition parties were marginalized from the foundation of the new political regime, 
promoting a rapid polarization of the party system.  
Chávez’s election represented the final breakdown of the consensus mechanisms that 
were set up by the Punto Fijo pact. In 1961, the Congressional Committee in charge of drafting 
the Constitution designed it to over-represent minority groups. The Constituent Assembly of 
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consultation process for drafting the new constitution. The manner in which the new political 
system emerged signaled the beginning of the complete collapse of cooperation.   
 
3. First Period: The Consolidation of Democracy—Cooperation and Stability 
(1958-1988) 
 
The paper identifies two major periods during Venezuela’s democratic experience in which the 
explanatory variables—political institutions and policymaking processes—have notably different 
characteristics. The first period of democratic consolidation (1958-1988), was characterized by 
cooperation, low political volatility, low fragmentation, and limited political competition. In 
contrast, the second period (1989-2004), of party system deconsolidation, has been characterized 
by a significant decline in cooperation, high political volatility, and high political fragmentation. 
3.1  The Policymaking Process in the First Period 
Under the theoretical perspective of Spiller, Stein and Tommasi (2003), the first period can be 
generally characterized as having conditions highly conducive to political cooperation: few key 
political actors, repeated play, and low stakes of power. As will be developed in Section 5, this 
cooperation seems to be positively reflected in some features of the public policies of the period: 
they were relatively less volatile than the ones in the second period and some were relatively 
more effective (e.g. autonomy and efficiency of PDVSA, high growth rate in 1958-1978, health 
and education expansion, stable international policy, etc.). 
As explained in the previous section, the democratic process was brought to life by a 
political agreement between the three leading political parties. Political leaders gave 
preeminence to obtaining political stability, given the failure of the first democratic experiment 
(1945-1948). Concurrent agreements incorporated the umbrella organizations of labor unions 
(CTV) and business groups (Fedecamaras); as well as the Catholic Church and the military. The 
only key player explicitly excluded was the communist party (PCV). 
The leading characteristics of the policymaking process in this period were: 
 
1)  Few key players and repeated play (stable actors). Centralized decision-making at the 
national level. Leading role of parties and the national party leadership. 
2)  Marginal role of the legislature, but significant role of parties. 
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4)  Corporatist arrangements formally incorporating labor and business groups to the 
policymaking process. Crucial role of oil rent distribution for political stability. 
3.1.1 The Key Political Actors Were Few and Stable 
The policymaking process included relatively few key players, primarily: the presidents, the 
national leaders of the two major parties (the AD and COPEI), and the leaders of the two peak 
corporatist interest groups (the CTV and Fedecamaras). The existence of a highly centralized, 
disciplined, and non-fragmented party system, and the fact that the concerns of interest groups 
were channeled through corporatist arrangements with the peak labor and business associations, 
allowed the president to conduct policy consultation with a very limited number of actors. 
Compared to the Latin American region and to the second period (1989-2003), the policymaking 
process in this first period can be characterized as one in which the policy process was 
concentrated in very few and stable players. 
The six presidential administrations in this 30-year period were represented by only two 
parties: the AD (four times) and COPEI (two times). The same parties generally controlled the 
leadership of Congress. With a few exceptions, the two parties controlled or heavily influenced 
the leading corporatist groups and were influenced by them. Parties were typically governed by a 
president, a secretary general, and a national committee. Party leaders were very stable. In the 
AD, six fundamental leaders, four of whom became president, led the party from 1958-1988. In 
the COPEI, three fundamental leaders, two of whom became president, led the party. National 
party leaders had relatively long tenures and almost all were members of Congress with long 
legislative careers. National party leaders decided how the party voted in Congress and the 
congressional delegation dutifully voted according to the party line. Similarly, national party 
leaders had significant control over congressional nominations.  
Inter-temporal linkages among key political actors were strong. It was a repeated game 
with stable actors. It was very costly for an individual politician to deviate from the cooperative 
equilibrium of the two-party rule. Minority parties such as the MAS did not have a major 
policymaking role but were guaranteed access to small prerogatives in order to keep them 
“inside” the system (e.g., large autonomous budgets for universities and cultural projects 
controlled by the left). 
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elections of 1958, the effective number of parties (ENP) represented in the chamber of deputies 
was 2.57. In the next two elections the ENP rose significantly (to an average 4.56), mostly due to 
two significant splits in the AD (the largest party). However, the system consolidated again into 
a two-party system in the next four elections from 1973 to 1988. The ENP in that period was on 
average 2.65. In the elections of 1983, the ENP got to a low point of 2.42. In this first period, 
Venezuela’s party fragmentation was slightly below the Latin American average.
4 The Latin 
American regional ENP average was 2.84, while the Venezuelan average was 2.63. The Latin 
American average for 1978-2000 was 3.25. The Venezuelan average in the second period (1989-
2003) increased to 4.6. 
Party volatility in Congress was relatively low. In the Chamber of Deputies the Volatility 
Index was 18.9 percent in the period 1958-1988, below the Latin American average of 22.1 
percent.
5 Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 2, volatility tended to decline until 1988 (to 13.8 
percent). The average volatility increased dramatically in the period 1989-2000 to an average of 
38.1 percent, compared to a regional average of 23 percent. Volatility in the presidential vote 
was even lower in the first period (13.9 percent), almost half the regional average of 23.9 
percent.  It increased dramatically in the second period (52 percent) compared to a regional 
average of 28 percent. In the second period, Venezuela had the largest presidential vote volatility 
in the region. 
3.1.2 Marginal Role of the Legislature in the Policymaking Process 
Policy agreements were negotiated between the presidents, the national party leaders (the 
cogollos in Venezuelan popular jargon) and the peak corporatist groups, and then, if required, 
they were rubber-stamped into law by the disciplined party delegations in the legislature. The 
national party leaders were key members of the legislature. Also, Congress frequently delegated 
legislative authority to the president.  
Even though the use of informal arenas meant that agreements were less formal than they 
would have been if made in the legislature and as a result were harder to observe and enforce, the 
existence of disciplined parties provided a structure that enabled inter-temporal cooperation. 
                                                 
4 For the years for which we have comparative data: 1978-1989. Regional averages were calculated using data by 
Payne et al. (2002). 
5 For the years for which we have comparative data: 1978-1989. Regional averages were calculated using data by 
Payne et al. (2002). 
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Marshall’s (1988) U.S. committee system. Also, when the president’s coalition had a majority in 
the Legislature, the president was typically given an enabling law to legislate by decree. Finally, 
as will be shown below, the executive often created policy-advising commissions with the 
involvement of the CTV and Fedecamaras (Crisp, 2000).   
The relatively marginal role played by the legislature in the Venezuelan policymaking 
process can be illustrated by the low number of laws approved compared to other countries in the 
region. According to Coppedge (1994), from 1959-1995 the Venezuelan Congress passed an 
average of 29 laws per year. In comparison, the Brazilian Senate passed more than 800 laws per 
year, the Argentinean Chamber of Deputies more than 300, and the Colombian Congress more 
than 70. Clearly, these indicators should be used with caution, because they may be the result of 
differences in the type of output of the legislative process in each country. Calculations based on 
data collected from the Venezuelan Legislature also show a relatively low yearly output of laws 
in the first period compared to the second one. From 1959-1989 a yearly average of 27 laws and 
eight ordinary laws was approved. From 1989-2001 the yearly average output of laws increased 
to 41 laws (an increase of 52 percent) and 12 ordinary laws (an increase of 50 percent).
6 Part of 
the explanation for the increase in output might be related to exogenous factors, such as 
increasing economic difficulties. Nevertheless, the data tends to support the hypothesis that 
Congress played a less significant role in the first period compared to the second. 
The marginality of legislators in the policymaking process is confirmed by the data on 
initiation of laws. During the period 1959-1989, the executive initiated 87 percent of the laws 
approved and Congress initiated only 13 percent. Since some of those laws (like public credit 
laws) had to be initiated by the Executive, a better indicator might be the initiation of ordinary 
laws approved, of which 66 percent were initiated by the executive and only 34 percent by 
members of the legislature. Again, the first period contrasts with the second period in this 
respect. In the second period (1990-2001), the percentage of laws initiated by the Legislature 
doubled to 26 percent. In the case of ordinary laws, the percentage initiated by legislators 
increased to 64 percent, a dramatic shift. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the initiation of 
ordinary laws by the executive and the legislature. As can be seen, in the period of two-party 
dominance and lowest party fragmentation (1973-1988), the executive’s legislative dominance 
                                                 
6 Authors’ calculations based on data collected from the Servicio Autónomo de Información Legislativa (SAIL). 
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initiation of approved laws.
7 
In the seven legislative terms included in the first period (1958-1988), a majority of the 
legislators (60 percent) lasted only one term in Congress (five years). A small minority (8.3 
percent) lasted four terms or more (that is 20 years or more). However, of those who lasted four 
terms or more (about 75 legislators) more than 80 percent belonged to the parties’ national 
leadership, confirming that leaders did have long tenures. Members of parliament (including both 
chambers) lasted an average of 1.8 terms and deputies 1.6 terms. Given the relatively low party 
volatility described before, the most plausible hypothesis is that the turnover rate of legislators is 
the result of not being re-nominated. In the second period (1989-2004), legislators lasted even 
less than in the first. 82 percent of legislators lasted just one term, 17 percent lasted two terms, 
and only 1 percent of its members have been in the legislature in all three terms. Figure 4 shows 
the number of terms lasted by legislators during the whole democratic history (1958-2000). As 
shown, 64 percent of legislators lasted just one period. That is, almost two-thirds of the 
legislators in Venezuela’s history were in Parliament for just one term.  
As shown in Figure 5, the percentage of new legislators (turnover) tended to decline in 
the first period. In the first three terms from 1963-1973, it was on average 71 percent, whereas in 
1963-1973 it declined significantly to 55 percent as the two-party system consolidated. In the 
second period, the percentage of new legislators rises again to an average of 78 percent (82 
percent in the current legislature). Compared to other presidential countries for which there is 
data for turnover, the figure for the first period (63 percent) is not extremely high. In Argentina 
about 80 percent of the legislators are not re-elected. In Brazil the figure is 57 percent, in 
Ecuador 73 percent, in Chile 41 percent and in the U.S. 17 percent.
8 In contrast, in the second 
period, turnover reached Argentinean levels (78 percent).  
Party discipline was extremely high in this period. Virtually all votes were counted with 
raised hands, since perfect discipline was assumed (roll calls were almost never used). In the few 
instances in which a party member did not want to follow the party line, his alternate member 
replaced him and voted according to the party line. The lack of individual member initiative 
                                                 
7 Authors’ calculations based on data collected from the Servicio Autónomo de Información Legislativa (SAIL). 
8 Araujo et al. (2004). The figure for Venezuela is not perfectly comparable with the other countries. In the case of 
Venezuela, the figure refers to the percentage of members in Congress who had not been in it before and turnover. 
The figure for the other countries refers to the percentage re-elected of those who were candidates. 
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congressmen did not contribute to it either. Committees were not very relevant, since they did 
not have agenda setting or gate-keeping powers. There were open amendments on the floor. 
Membership in committees had also a high turnover. Committees were reshuffled each year, and 
most members changed committees each time (Crisp, 2001; Paravisini, 1998). However, there 
were a few committees like the Finance Committee and the Foreign Policy Committee in which 
some legislators did develop some relevant expertise and had longer tenures. They were 
members of the party leadership who negotiated the budget with the Executive and monitored the 
efforts toward having a bipartisan long-term foreign policy.
9 In general, it can be said that in 
Venezuela, legislators have been amateur lawmakers, with the exception of the national party 
leaders in the first period. 
3.1.3 Predominant Role of Presidents, Delegation by Parties and the Legislature 
In the 1961 Constitution, as will be explained below, presidents did not have significant 
legislative prerogatives. The president had legislative decree authority only if Congress 
previously delegated it through an enabling law, or allowed it as a result of the suspension of a 
constitutional right. During this period, Congress delegated special legislative powers (enabling 
laws) to the President three times. In addition, Congress generally allowed presidents to have 
limited legislative decree authority in economic matters (due to the suspension of a constitutional 
economic right). The President could also use some limited non-legislative decree authority 
without needing congressional approval. For example, he could set the rules (reglamento) for the 
detailed implementation of a law, theoretically, as long as the rules did not contradict the law 
(Brewer Carías, 1980; Crisp, 1997).  
Despite being constitutionally weak, presidents dominated the policymaking process. 
They were often delegated legislative powers and, as discussed above, initiated most of the 
legislation approved in Congress. The lack of expertise and experience in the Legislature was 
often compensated for by delegating to the executive. However, party leaders maintained veto 
power over legislation, setting significant limits on the exercise of presidential power. The 
cooperative equilibrium made presidents look quite powerful but their powers were limited, as 
would become evident once cooperation declined. 
                                                 
9 The Finance Committee was the only one with gate-keeping power with respect to the budget. Interview with 
Gustavo Tarre, former leader of COPEI’s congressional delegation and chairman of the Finance Committee. 
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period of less than a year on economic and financial matters. The enabling law established limits 
to the delegated authority and Congress could modify the decree-laws if it desired to do so. 
Nevertheless, the delegated authority gave the president significant agenda-setting power to 
establish the status quo. All the presidents with a majority in Congress in the first period (three) 
obtained this prerogative. In contrast, in this period minority presidents were not given enabling 
laws. In 1961, President Betancourt was delegated legislative authority for one year. He was 
authorized to legislate in a variety of economic and public administration matters. He used his 
powers in a limited way, decreeing 15 laws (Brewer Carías, 1980; Crisp, 1997). Betancourt 
governed in a Cabinet coalition with the COPEI and the URD, and as a result all the relevant 
parties participated cooperatively in the design of these laws. Presidents Leoni (AD) and Caldera 
(COPEI) were not given enabling laws.  
The next president who obtained an enabling law was Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD) in 1974. 
The AD had a comfortable majority in both houses of Congress. The oil price boom of 1973 
gave the government unprecedented wealth, and Pérez wanted to use it to implement an 
aggressive state-led development plan. He dictated 53 law-decrees, about twice the average 
amount of laws per year produced by Congress in the period (27). Even though Congress 
established a congressional oversight committee, the AD majority in the committee made it 
ineffective as a monitoring device. Opposition members in the commission resigned in protest. 
This episode is illustrative of the decline in cooperation in the policymaking process that 
occurred during the Pérez administration. In the future, enabling laws were much more restricted 
than the one provided to Pérez. Moreover, his party decided not to give Pérez an enabling law in 
his second term (1989-1993). His administration was clearly deviant in terms of the degree of 
autonomy to implement his preferred policies that the president normally had.  
The windfall of oil resources dramatically increased the informal powers of the president 
in a way for which the political system was not prepared. In addition, the decline of the threat 
presented by the guerrillas and the military in the 1960s made cooperation a less compelling 
strategy and, in combination with the oil income, allowed for the establishment of a two-party 
cartel.  
The last administration of the first period, President Lusinchi’s, received decree powers 
in 1984 to face the economic downturn produced by the decline in oil income, though the powers 
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within the boundaries of the delegated authority (Crisp, 1998 and 2000). 
The president could also decree the suspension of some constitutional rights, and as long 
as Congress did not re-establish the rights (by simple majority), the president had law-decree 
authority in that area. However, whenever the constitutional rights were re-established, the 
decrees—justified in this manner—ceased to be effective. Throughout this period the economic 
rights in the constitution were suspended. The crucial economic role of the state provided the 
rationale for this suspension. Presidents used this authority to systematically intervene in markets 
(e.g., to fix prices). Again, Pérez and Lusinchi (1984-1989), the presidents with the largest 
majorities, used these powers extensively, while minority and coalition governments used it 
limitedly. Pérez made 67 (average 13 per year) decrees and Lusinchi made 58 (average 12 per 
year). The other four administrations, in contrast, made an average of just 12 (three per year). 
After 1989, Presidents Pérez (second administration, 1989-1993) and Caldera (second 
administration) used these powers sparingly, making an average of three decrees per year.
10 In 
fact, Pérez re-established economic rights during most of his second administration. The clear 
correlation between single-party majority governments and increased use of this power provides 
evidence that its use was limited by the legislature. Even though the legislature forced the re-
establishment of the constitutional rights on only one occasion, presidents knew that if they used 
this power extensively against the wishes of the legislature they could lose power.  
3.1.4 Corporatist Arrangements in the Policymaking Process 
In terms of the participation of interest groups in the policymaking process, very few 
democracies in the region had so few (and stable) players participating. In Venezuela, there 
existed single peak dominant associations of labor and business, which were incorporated 
formally into the policy process. According to Crisp (2000), only Chile and Mexico had similar 
single peak associations, and only in Mexico were they formally incorporated as often as in 
Venezuela. In the period 1958-1988, these types of corporatist arrangements were more 
frequently used and were given more importance than in the period 1989-1998. In Chávez’s 
presidency they have completely broken down.  
                                                 
10 Data from Crisp (1997, p. 191). 
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explained before, the legislator’s job was to rubber-stamp decisions already negotiated by the 
national party leaders and the Executive. As a result, lobbying at the policy-design phase 
occurred basically through two formal channels: corporatist representation inside parties and 
presidential consultative commissions. At the implementation phase, lobbying had a formal role 
through corporatist members of the boards of directors of the decentralized public 
administration.  
The Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV) was dominated by members of the 
AD, with COPEI having a minority representation on its board. Other relevant corporatist groups 
such as the Peasants Federation had a similar party composition. On the other hand, parties had 
powerful workers’ bureaus that had significant representation on the National Committees of the 
parties and in Congress. In the case of the business umbrella group, Fedecamaras, party 
involvement was subtler. Nevertheless, many presidents of Fedecamaras were tied to a particular 
party, and some of the board members were tied to the parties. 
All presidents in the period made extensive use of consultative commissions for the 
design of policy. Between 1959 and 1989, Venezuelan presidents created 330 advisory 
commissions (Crisp, 2000). These commissions institutionalized corporatist consultation. Citing 
Crisp (p. 119): “Umbrella groups for capital and organized labor were considered partners in 
decision making who had every right to make their voices heard on virtually every issue.” As a 
result, four groups clearly dominated the commissions: the AD, the COPEI, the CTV, and 
Fedecamaras. Another important feature is that most commissions were dominated on a national 
level, with little representation from the regions (Crisp, 2000). A significant amount of the 
legislation initiated by the Executive had its genesis in these commissions. According to Crisp 
(2000, p. 115), the composition of the commissions appointed by AD presidents was: 62 percent 
government officials, 14 percent business representatives, 7 percent representatives of 
professional associations, 8 percent labor representatives, 9 percent other. The composition of 
commissions appointed by COPEI presidents was: 48 percent government, 17 percent business, 8 
percent professionals, 8 percent labor, and 18 percent other. The proportions varied with the type 
of commission, but not to a significant degree.
11 As Crisp (2000, p. 116) argues: “Looking at the 
                                                 
11 Crisp (2000) classifies the commissions as: producer, regulatory, planning, service, and promoter of the private 
sector. 
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striking feature is how little the relative position of each category of participant changes.” As a 
result, a change in the governing party did little to alter the access of interest groups to the 
policymaking process.  
Crisp concludes: “This (stability) calls into question the ideological differences between 
the major two parties and the impact of elections in Venezuela.” One explanation for this 
apparent puzzle is the high degree of cooperation that existed. As the theoretical framework of 
Spiller, Stein and Tommasi (2003) suggests, in a cooperative environment parties would not 
significantly change policies as a result of transfers of power. In the case of Venezuela, the 
bipartisan distribution of oil rents through formal corporatist arrangements combined with the 
institutional framework in place reduced the stakes of power and made cooperation possible. 
The Venezuelan state created a large amount of governmental agencies and state-owned 
companies, known collectively as the decentralized public administration (DPA). A significant 
proportion of policies in the first period were implemented through these agencies. The 
corporatist groups’ representation in the DPA was also institutionalized. Again the AD, the 
COPEI, the CTV and Fedecamaras had the most significant roles. In the 1959-1989 period, 
governments created 362 bureaucratic agencies. Of those, 68 were governed by public law. The 
creation of DPA agencies peaked in the first Pérez administration (1974-1979). Again, the oil-
hike influence and the deviation represented by the Pérez administration are evident. In five 
years Pérez created a total of 159 agencies (44 percent of the total) and 21 public law agencies 
(31 percent) (Crisp, 2000). 
The corporatist composition of the boards of the DPA also remained relatively stable 
across administrations. According to Crisp (2000), the agencies created by the AD had the 
following composition by sectors: 48 percent government, 31 percent economic groups, 10 
percent capital, 5 percent professionals, 16 percent labor, and 21 percent others. The agencies 
created by the COPEI: 62 percent government, 26 percent economic groups, 11 percent capital, 5 
percent professionals, 10 percent labor and 12 percent others. Again, the party in power had a 
minimal effect on the participation of corporatist groups (except that the AD created agencies 
with more labor participation).  
Examples of corporatist participation in DPA agencies are: a) the Agricultural Bank: of 
the five-member board, three members represented producer and peasant groups; b) the 
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Fedecamaras and the Banking Association; c) the Industrial Credit Fund had representatives 
from the CTV, the Industrial Council (an affiliate of Fedecamaras), and the Federation of Small 
Industrials (Combellas, 1999). Even the Central Bank (BCV) had representatives from the CTV 
and Fedecamaras on its board until the early 1990s. The DPA served as one of the main channels 
for distributing oil wealth. Even though it was highly politicized and inefficient, it was also 
highly cooperative and relatively stable. In this case, cooperation did not necessarily imply 
efficiency. 
3.2 Institutional Foundations of the First Period: 1958-1988 
Many characteristics of the political system and the policymaking process in the first period can 
be partially attributed to the institutional framework set up in the Pact of Punto Fijo and the 
Constitution of 1961. As mentioned before, their key objective was to attain political stability in 
light of imminent threats from military coup plotters and the leftist guerrillas supported by Cuba. 
The memory of the failed democratic experience of 1945-1948, when the AD exercised 
hegemonic power, also weighed heavily on the founders when they designed the institutional 
foundations of the political system. To a significant extent, the strong disciplined parties, the 
relatively low fragmentation despite the pure proportional representation system, the 
centralization of decision-making at the national level, the significant delegation of policymaking 
to the president, the marginal role of Congress, the lack of expertise of the legislators, the low 
volatility and low polarization of the party system; were all a result of the institutional 
foundations. The fundamental institutional foundations were: 
 
1) A constitutionally weak president with some significant delegation of informal 
powers. Limited presidential power reduced the stakes of power, guaranteed the party 
leaders veto over major policy changes, and reduced the costs of being out of power 
for the opposition. Given the high degree of inter-party cooperation and the strong 
and disciplined parties induced by the institutional setting, having a weak president 
did not generate high inter-branch obstructionism.   
2)  The plurality presidential election held concurrently with all legislative elections, the 
inexistence of elections for regional executive offices, and the ballot structure 
engineered to maximize presidential coattails induced a relatively concentrated party 
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fragmentation and rarely produces a two-party system, was significantly compensated 
by the factors mentioned above. The low index of disproportionality of the 
proportional system provides evidence that it was not the source of party 
concentration. The proportionality guaranteed a contained political space for minority 
groups. 
3)  The proportional representation system, with single closed and blocked party lists and 
with only one ballot for all legislative bodies, strengthened the power of national 
party leaders over the party legislators. The lack of regional elected offices did not 
provide alternative opportunities for regional leaders and increased the costs of 
defecting from the large parties (i.e., those with probability of obtaining the 
presidency). 
4)  The very high discipline of parties in Congress, a by-product of the electoral system, 
did not provide incentives for individual legislators to specialize or acquire legislative 
expertise. Decision-making was centralized in the national party leadership. The fact 
that legislators’ careers were completely dependent on the party leadership made 
Congress an institutional skeleton in which decisions made by the party bosses were 
generally rubber-stamped. As a result, the Legislature was relatively marginalized 
from the policymaking process. Most legislators did not stay in Congress for long 
periods; only the party leaders did. 
5)  The lack of expertise and marginality of legislators in the decision making process 
and the limits set to presidential powers might explain why party leaders were willing 
to delegate policymaking to the Executive branch. The corporatist arrangements, such 
as the presidential commissions and decentralized public administration, allowed for 
party involvement and “fire-alarms” at lower levels of the policymaking process.    
3.2.1 The Executive Branch 
The literature on the Venezuelan presidency appears to show a remarkable contradiction. 
Comparative studies, such as those by Shugart and Carey (1992) and Payne et al. (2002), argue 
that the Venezuelan president (before the 1999 Constitution) had the weakest legislative powers 
of any president in the Latin American region (and among the weakest in all other world 
presidential systems). In contrast, most of the literature focused on the Venezuelan political 
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following the tradition of powerful caudillos that historically prevailed in the region (Coppedge, 
1994; Crisp, 1997; Corrales, 2002).  
Here it is argued that even though in equilibrium the Venezuelan president seemed very 
powerful since he had the leading policy role, his powers were in fact significantly restricted by 
the 1961 Constitution. As explained before, the framers, who were the leaders of the parties, set 
those restrictions deliberately to limit potential deviations. To a large extent, the behavioral 
appearance of power was the result of the limited delegation by the national party leaders of 
strong and disciplined parties in a cooperative environment. However, it is also true that the 
Venezuelan president had some relevant formal and informal powers that have not been 
generally incorporated in the comparative literature and that varied between the two periods in 
study.  
As will be explained below, in the second period (the 1990s), once the president’s 
partisan powers and other informal powers declined, the president began to look relatively weak. 
Eventually, the 1999 Constitution increased the presidential powers dramatically, changing the 
policymaking process and increasing the stakes of power. 
The literature classifies the constitutional powers into legislative powers (law-making 
authority, reactive and proactive) and non-legislative powers (power to appoint and remove 
Cabinet and other officials) (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Payne et al., 2002). Under the 
Constitution of 1961 (derogated in 1999), the Venezuelan president had very limited legislative 
powers, especially if compared with the Latin American region (which in average had stronger 
powers than the other presidential systems in the world). Venezuela had the lowest value in the 
index of legislative powers developed by Shugart and Carey (1992). This index is calculated 
using the simple addition of a point value ranging from zero (low) to four (high) assigned in six 
categories of legislative power. The six categories are package veto, partial veto, decree power, 
exclusive introduction of legislation, budget power, and referendum. The Venezuelan president 
had the weakest level of power of any Latin American country in all six categories (zero points 
in all). The Latin American regional point average in the period 1958-1988 was 4.6.
12 The South 
                                                 
12 Including all constitutions covered by the authors in the period 1958-1992. 
  31American average excluding Venezuela was 5.4 points. In Latin America, only Peru (before 
Fujimori) had a president with as limited legislative powers as Venezuela’s.
13 
Legislative powers include reactive powers such as the power to veto legislation 
(partially or the whole law). Most presidents can use their veto as a negotiation tool with the 
Legislature, but in Venezuela the veto served only to delay the approval of legislation, since the 
same simple majority that could approve a law could override the president’s veto. In practice, 
the veto was used only a few times and was always overridden by Congress.
14 The evidence 
suggests that the power to delay the approval of legislation for a few weeks did not give the 
president much muscle to negotiate.
15  
The authority to legislate by presidential decree is one of the most significant proactive 
powers. The Venezuelan president did not have autonomous decree power, unless enabled or 
allowed by Congress. That is why Shugart and Carey (1992) gave zero points to Venezuela in 
this category. However, as was discussed above, in practice some presidents used those decree 
powers intensively.  
Another proactive power is the exclusive initiative for legislation in specific areas. Here 
again, the Venezuelan president had no prerogatives.
16 This lack of prerogatives contrasts with 
other countries such as Brazil and Chile where this power is extensive in many areas (Payne et 
al., 2002). An additional presidential legislative prerogative is the power to call for a popular 
referendum to pass certain legislation, without the need of Congress’ approval. In Venezuela, 
this option was not provided by the 1961 Constitution.
17 The presidential prerogatives in the 
approval of the budget were also below the regional average. According to the Constitution, the 
Executive introduced the budget proposal in Congress, which could change the amount allocated 
to the items in the proposal but could not increase the overall level of spending. In practice, 
Congress could increase indirectly the overall spending by understating mandatory expenditures 
                                                 
13 Other countries had much higher scores, for example: Brazil 7 points (1946), Chile 12 points (1969), Colombia 8, 
Ecuador 6, and Uruguay 6 (Shugart and Carey, 1992). 
14 The lack of the use of the presidential veto does not necessarily imply that it was not effective, because it could be 
that the off-the-path threat of its use induced a more favorable equilibrium for the president. However, that does not 
seem to be the case in Venezuela. 
15 Interview with Gustavo Tarre. 
16 The only exception was the budget law, which is introduced by the Executive in all regional democracies. 
17 As will be shown, below this is one of the areas where the Constitution of 1999 promoted by President Chávez 
increased the presidential prerogatives dramatically. 
  32such as debt payments. Shugart and Carey (1992) also gave Venezuela a score of zero in this 
category.
18  
The Venezuelan president had non-legislative powers of Cabinet formation and dismissal 
in line with most Latin American countries (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Payne et al., 2002).
19 
However, one crucial element that has not been captured by the comparative literature on 
presidential powers is the authority to appoint and dismiss governors. Before 1989, the 
Venezuelan president could freely appoint and dismiss all governors. In practice this meant that 
the president had control over the Constitutional allotment of the national budget to the regions.
20 
The power to appoint governors makes a significant difference, especially in a country that is 
formally federal.
21 
The literature has also identified an alternative indirect source of presidential authority, 
partisan powers in the legislature. The number of significant parties and the discipline and 
cohesion of parties can all affect partisan support for the president. However, it is important to 
differentiate this type of power from those that are constitutionally provided. The constitution 
provides the formal rules of the game. In contrast, the partisan powers are an equilibrium result 
derived from the interaction of political institutions and other social and political factors. In 
practice, real ability to use formal constitutional powers is constrained and expanded by these 
other factors. The argument advanced here is that the constitutionally weak Venezuelan president 
seemed in equilibrium to be quite powerful, but such powers were contingent on other factors 
such as the strong party system, the right to appoint governors, and the control of significant oil 
rents. Once these factors changed, the weak formal powers became evident, as occurred in the 
1990s.  
Presidents enjoyed relatively high partisan powers in the first period. They never faced a 
majority opposition and had very strong disciplined parties backing them. Between 1958 and 
1988, three of the six presidents (50 percent) had a partisan majority in the lower house. Four out 
of six (67 percent) had majorities in coalition with other parties. In contrast, of the four 
                                                 
18 Which seems slightly low using their criteria. In other countries such as Argentina or the United States, the 
constitutional powers of the president relative to the Congress seemed even lower. 
19 According to Shugart and Carey (1992), the score for non-legislative powers in Venezuela (1961 Constitution) is 
12, the same as the regional median and slightly above the mean of 11.8. 
20 Corresponding to a minimum of 15 percent of the budget. 
21 Imagine for example that in Argentina or Brazil the president appointed all regional and local authorities; it would 
imply, in practice, a significant increase in the presidential powers in other areas of the policymaking process, such 
as budget approval and implementation.   
  33administrations in the second period (1988-2003), none had a single party majority in the lower 
house, and only one (25 percent) -Chávez 2000-2005- has had a majority in coalition with other 
parties.
22 The Latin American regional average, for the period 1978-2002, was 30.2 percent (of 
time the presidential administration had a presidential party majority in the lower house) and 
54.1 percent (majority coalition).
23  
3.2.2 Presidential Elections, Concurrency, and its consequences 
Presidents were elected by plurality for five-year terms in direct elections concurrent with the 
legislative elections (for all seats). Until 1993, the voter had just one ballot (tarjetón) to vote for 
both the president and the Legislature. One card with the color and symbol of the party (and 
since the 1970s the photo of the presidential candidate) had to be marked to vote for the 
president, and next to it a smaller identical card had to be marked to vote for both chambers of 
the Legislature. Voters could not split their vote between chambers. The combination of plurality 
(as opposed to runoff) with concurrency, and the structure of the ballot maximized presidential 
coattails.
24 The presidential election—due to its winner-take-all nature—tends to produce a 
strategically concentrated vote, and combined with high coattails, produces high party 
concentration. An additional element promoting concentration was the inexistence of regional 
elections. The evidence seems to point to the significance of coattails and vote concentration. As 
can be see in Figure 6, the difference between the vote for the top two presidential candidates 
and the vote for their parties (in the period 1958-1988) was always below 10 percentage points, 
with the exception of the 1988 election, when dissatisfaction with the AD and COPEI started to 
increase.  
Until 1999, Venezuelan presidents had non-immediate re-election (could run again only 
when two presidential periods had elapsed, after the end of their presidency). Coppedge (1994) 
gives a prominent role to this institutional feature. He argues that it made all presidents “lame 
ducks,” at the same time promoting party factionalism by maintaining former presidents as 
powerful actors that could eventually become presidents a second time (as did Caldera 1969-
1974 and 1994-1999; and Pérez 1974-1979 and 1989-1993). The lack of immediate presidential 
                                                 
22 Authors’ calculations based on data from Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE). 
23 Latin American data from Payne et al. (2002) 
24 In their comparative project, Payne et al. (2002), argue that the combination of plurality with concurrency 
maximizes the tendency towards concentration of the party system. 
  34re-election combined with the absence of term limits for legislators provided an advantage for 
party leaders. 
3.2.3 The Legislative Branch and the Party System 
As explained above, the legislature was characterized by low party fragmentation, despite the 
pure proportional representation system. Parties were highly disciplined and the national party 
leadership decided the vote of their congressional delegation. As a result, individual legislators 
played a relatively marginal role in the policymaking process. Most legislators were amateurs, 
lasting an average of 1.8 periods of the 7 constitutional periods (26 percent of the time). 
However, party leaders were very stable and remained in Congress for longer periods. To a large 
extent, these characteristics of the party system can be derived from the institutional foundations. 
In particular, the type of electoral system and the inexistence of regional elections for executive 
officials provided national party leaders with powerful tools with which to discipline and control 
their party’s rank and file. The institutional restrictions on political competition and the control 
of oil rents allowed the AD and COPEI to create a cartel that enjoyed a high degree of stability.  
Between 1958 and 1988, legislative elections were done using a pure proportional 
representation (PR) system with single closed and blocked lists, applying the D’Hondt electoral 
formula. There were 23 districts equivalent to the states. The average district magnitude was 6.1, 
which was medium sized compared to the Latin American region. Five countries in the region 
have larger average district magnitude and 10 countries have lower average district magnitude 
(Taagapera and Shugart, 1989; Payne et al., 2002). To make it even more proportional, some 
additional deputies were allocated to reflect the national party share of the vote (up to a 
maximum of five). The ballot was structured so that there was only one vote for all legislative 
bodies.  
The Venezuelan proportional representation system had on average an index of 
disproportionality of 4.4, below the Latin American regional average of 5.4, suggesting it did not 
significantly over-represent larger parties (Payne et al, 2002).
25 The index of disproportionality in 
the lower house for Venezuela varied between 3.5 and 5.7 in the 1958-1988 period. The index 
has significantly increased in the last two elections (1998 and 2000), partly as a result of the 
                                                 
25 A larger index reflects a system that over-represents large parties and under-represents smaller parties. 
  35mixed member personalized proportional system implemented in 1993. In relative terms, the 
Venezuelan system has become more disproportional compared to the region. 
It is clear then that the low fragmentation of the party system in the first period cannot be 
explained by the proportional representation system. Instead, the PR system guaranteed that all 
minorities were represented in the Venezuelan Legislature. As explained above, the low 
fragmentation had other institutional foundations: the concurrency with plurality presidential 
elections, the ballot structure, and the inexistence of regional elections. Likewise, as will be 
discussed below, the increased fragmentation that occurred in the 1990s cannot be explained by 
the change to a mixed member electoral system in 1993, which in fact should have, ceteris 
paribus, produced a less fragmented system given the increase in the index of disproportionality. 
Instead, it can be partially explained by the introduction of regional elections at a time of 
electoral realignment.
26 Changes in the ballot structure might have also contributed.  
Venezuela’s legislature was bicameral until 1999. Although the existence of two 
chambers could imply having an additional veto point, the fact that both chambers were elected 
concurrently, for the same period, and until 1993 by casting the same ballot, reduced the 
difference in composition of both chambers. However, their composition was still different due 
to the difference in district magnitude and malapportionment.
27 Senators were elected in districts 
of smaller magnitude, two per state, compared with deputies’ districts with a wide range of 
magnitudes averaging six. As a result, since lower district magnitudes produce more 
disproportionality, the largest parties tended to have a slightly larger proportion of the senators 
than of the deputies. This majoritarian tendency favored the AD and COPEI. Malapportionment 
in the Senate was significant. Poor, rural, and unpopulated regions were over-represented. The 
AD and COPEI did better in these areas than the smaller parties. The high party discipline and 
their similar origin limited the independent role of the two chambers. In practice, as has been 
argued, the relevant players were national party leaders. Both chambers of the legislature simply 
rubber-stamped most decisions negotiated by party leaders. In all the periods in which the 
president had a working majority in the lower house he also had one in the upper chamber. 
                                                 
26 The electoral realignment produced by the decline in electoral support for the AD and COPEI can be partly 
attributed to the poor economic performance of 1978-1988.  
27 Malapportionment refers to the degree to which the geographical distribution of seats matches the distribution of 
the population. For example, if an unpopulated state is equally represented in the Senate as a highly populated state, 
there exists high malapportionment. 
  36The single closed and blocked list electoral system constituted a powerful disciplinarian 
tool in the hands of the party leadership. The Venezuelan system allowed the party leadership to 
control the nominations (who gets in the list) and the order of election (who gets elected first), 
pool the votes of party candidates (no intra-party rivalry), and limit internal competition. Shugart 
and Carey’s (1992) index of party leadership strength due to the electoral system gives 
Venezuela a value of 8, above the regional average of 6. Only three countries in the region have 
a higher index.  
Under the Venezuelan system, individual legislators did not have any incentive to 
cultivate personal vote. Voters did not vote for candidates but for party cards. District magnitude 
in the lower chamber was high enough to create free-rider incentives for individual legislators in 
the campaign. The constitution or the laws did not regulate the internal party nomination 
procedure. However, since the personal electoral connection was so tenuous, party leaders did 
not have any incentives to identify candidates with highest voter support. Their choice of the 
composition and order of the list had little impact on the voter’s decision. As a result, 
endogenously the parties’ nomination processes had a strong tendency to be controlled by the 
national leadership. 
One of the most centralized parties and the model for most other parties was the AD. In 
the AD, the National Executive Council (CEN) that governed the party had significant control 
over the nomination process. Regional party authorities sent a list with three times more names 
than the magnitude of their district. The CEN reserved the right to pick one third of the 
candidates from outside the list and had free reign in establishing the order of the list. In practice, 
this meant that the CEN decided who could get elected (Crisp, 2001). Other parties had slightly 
more democratic nomination procedures, but in all parties, the national party leadership had the 
strongest influence.  
In terms of voting thresholds, there were low formal entry barriers for new parties. 
However, in practice the fact that there was only a nationally elected executive with significant 
resources at its disposal increased the economic costs of entry (e.g., national campaign finance). 
Also, the fact that there were only two relevant parties in the 1973-1988 period minimized 
incentives for party defection. As can be expected from the institutional incentives provided by 
the system, party discipline in Venezuela was near perfect. There were extremely few episodes 
  37of legislators voting across party lines. In the period 1973-1988, when the party system 
consolidated, there were also very few party splits or significant defections. 
3.2.4 The Federal Structure  
Before 1989, even though the country was formally federal, no regional executive authorities 
were elected. Governors were freely appointed and removed by the president. The lack of 
regional elections had significant consequences for the party system. Governors did not have any 
incentive to cultivate their personal vote. On the contrary, they had to be completely loyal to the 
president. Governors were often personally connected to the president or the national party 
leaders and on occasion did not come from the region they governed. Governors had almost no 
influence in the approval of the national budget, and those who did not follow the orders of the 
president could be immediately dismissed. Local legislatures, like municipal councils and state 
assemblies, were elected. However, until 1979 they were elected with the same vote for the 
legislature, i.e., voters could not split their vote. Starting in 1979, the municipal councils were 
elected separately, but using the same electoral system that was used for the legislature. 
3.2.5 The Judiciary 
Congress elected the Supreme Court by simple majority in a joint session. Magistrates (and their 
alternates) were appointed for nine-year periods in a staggered process in which one-third was 
elected every three years. In order to increase the number of magistrates, a two-thirds majority of 
a joint session was required. They could be re-elected. Since the legislative term lasted five 
years, no congressional majority could elect more than two-thirds of the magistrates. As a result, 
the composition of the Supreme Court did not completely follow the legislative majorities. 
Evidence of the independence of the Court seems mixed. Most magistrates were selected in a 
negotiation between the leadership of the AD and COPEI.
28 However, the Court did sometimes 
serve as an enforcer of constitutional limits to presidential power, and presidents generally did 
not control the Court. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the Court could enforce rules against 
the wishes of the leadership of both parties. 
A keystone event occurred during the first non-AD presidency of Caldera. Until 1969, the 
executive and the legislature jointly appointed regular judges. The AD, which was out of the 
presidency for the first time, proposed a law to create the National Judicial Council appointed by 
                                                 
28 Apparently, some minority parties had some influence over the selection of just a few magistrates. 
  38Congress—where the AD had a plurality, but no majority—to appoint all of the country’s judges. 
Caldera attempted to block the law by challenging it before the Supreme Court. The Court 
allowed the approval of the law, and Congress elected the National Judicial Council, without the 
support of the COPEI (Crisp, 1997). In general, the lower courts elected by this Council were 
considered more politicized and less independent than the Supreme Court. 
4. Second Period: The Deconsolidation of Democracy—Decline and 
Breakdown of Cooperation: 1989-2004 
This section describes the changes in the policymaking process due to the profound 
transformation experienced by political institutions in the last 15 years. In contrast to the first 
period, which was characterized by few and stable actors, resulting in cooperative agreements, 
the second period has been characterized by multiple actors, high electoral volatility, and 
institutional instability. As a consequence, it has been more difficult to generate cooperative 
agreements among politicians or to create an adequate environment for sustainable reforms and 
long-term policy commitments. As will be discussed in Section 5, for example, during this 
period there has been a dramatic decline in the autonomy and capacity of the few pockets of 
professional bureaucracy that were created in the past, and Cabinet instability has significantly 
increased. In fact, after the election of Chávez in 1998 and the draft of a new Constitution in 
1999, political cooperation has experienced a complete breakdown. The new constitutional 
framework—which increased the stakes of power—has fostered political instability and 
polarization.  
The most significant institutional changes that occurred at the beginning of this period 
were: 
1) The introduction of direct elections for governors and mayors in 1989. These regional 
authorities were elected for three-year terms, with one immediate re-election. 
2) The modification of the legislature’s electoral system from pure proportional 
representation to a mixed-member system of personalized proportional representation in 
1993. The system continued being globally proportional, but a portion of the legislators 
were elected in electoral districts by plurality, establishing a personal electoral connection 
and increasing the system’s disproportionality. 
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parties and national party leaders. Also, in the context of a change in electoral preferences, these 
institutional transformations contributed to increased party fragmentation, volatility, and 
legislator turnover. 
In general, the policymaking process in the second period was characterized by: 
1)  Many and volatile key players. 
2)  More prominent role of the Legislature and the Judiciary, declining role of parties. 
3)  Less predominant role of presidents (until 1999). 
4)  Decline in influence of corporatist groups. 
5)  Increased role of the military. 
6)  Key role of regional authorities. Decentralization. 
7)  Increased stakes of power since the 1999 Constitution. 
 
The effective number of parties (ENP) in the chamber of deputies increased dramatically. 
In the previous period of two-party dominance (1973-1988), the ENP was on average just 2.6. As 
shown in Figure 1, it surged to 4.7 in 1993, and in 1998 it rose again to a maximum 6.1. In 2000, 
due to the significant share of Chávez’s party (MVR), it declined to 3.44, but among the 
opposition parties, fragmentation was even higher than in 1998. The average ENP of the second 
period (4.74) is significantly higher than the regional average in the period (3.5).
29 Venezuela 
went from being one of the least fragmented party systems to the third most fragmented in Latin 
America.
30 
Volatility has also dramatically increased in the second period. In terms of lower chamber 
seats, the average volatility in 1990-2000 was 38.12 percent, way above the Latin American 
average of 23 percent. Venezuela again moved from being one of the least volatile countries in 
the region to the second most volatile.
31 Compared to the first period, average volatility more 
than doubled (see Figure 2). In terms of volatility in presidential party vote, the increase is even 
more dramatic. It reached 52.8 percent and 59.5 percent in the 1993 and 1998 elections, 
respectively. On average, Venezuela has had the highest volatility in presidential voting in the 
                                                 
29 Venezuelan data from authors’ calculations based on CNE data. Regional data from authors’ calculations based on 
data from Payne et al. (2002) 
30 Only Brazil and Ecuador have a higher fragmentation. 
31 Just surpassed by Peru. Venezuelan data from authors’ calculations based on CNE data. Regional data from 
authors’ calculations based on data from Payne et al. (2002) 
  40region in the last 10 years. In terms of fragmentation and volatility, Venezuela became 
increasingly similar to countries such as Ecuador and Peru. 
In addition, during this period, civilian control over the military has been dramatically 
weakened, resulting in a higher risk of democratic breakdown. This situation contrasts with the 
previous 20 years, in which political parties managed to exercise significant control over the 
armed forces, helping to consolidate democratic rule. During 1989-2004, different factions 
within the armed forces attempted three failed military coups (two in 1992 and one in 2002). The 
increasing influence of the armed forces on civilian affairs has become even more salient after 
the election of Chávez. 
4.1 The Legislature 
The transformation of the policymaking process, along with the multiplication of relevant policy 
actors at the national and regional levels, implied that transaction costs increased substantially, 
making it more difficult for political players to credibly commit. Unlike the first period, in which 
political exchanges were conducted at low transaction costs in small groups, in this period 
transactions were negotiated among a larger number of players in more open and conflictive 
arenas. Paradoxically, as a result of the decline of party elite agreements, the legislature has 
played a much more significant role. National party leaders could not easily broker deals outside 
of Congress, as was done before. While in the first period legislators initiated on average just 13 
percent of all the laws approved, in the second period the figure doubled to 26 percent. In the 
case of ordinary laws, the change was also dramatic, increasing from an average of 34 percent in 
the first period to 62 percent in the second (see Figure 3). 
Between 1989 and 2004, legislators have become less disciplined and more specialized. 
Factions within parties and individual representatives have been able to undermine the power of 
party barons on specific policy issues. Key legislation approved at the national level (either by 
Congress or by executive decree), had to be negotiated with regional actors. Proponents had to 
introduce regional considerations to gain the support of governors and mayors. For example, 
legislators have been able to push reforms to deepen fiscal transfers to the regions despite the 
opposition from national party authorities and the national executive. Regional leaders have 
powerful incentives to extract more resources from the center, especially since Venezuela has the 
largest vertical fiscal imbalance in Latin America and the rules of the distribution of fiscal 
resources have become more discretionary. The indiscipline of legislators was not only 
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splitting off from the parties that had nominated them. Factions within consolidated political 
parties such as the AD, COPEI, MAS (and even Chávez’s MVR) have split off during the period 
1989-2004, creating their own independent legislative groups. Paravisini (1998) and Crisp 
(2001) found some evidence of the increased specialization of legislators—in issues relevant to 
their constituents – as a result of the closer electoral connection provided by the election in 
plurality districts of a significant proportion of the Legislature. 
4.2 Electoral Reforms 
Institutional instability has created weaker inter-temporal linkages among politicians and policy-
makers. These linkages have been debilitated by continuous changes in the institutional rules as 
well as increased political uncertainty due to the risk of breakdown of the democratic regime. 
The rules of the political game have been in permanent flux. After decades without significant 
modifications, electoral rules were changed four times and the constitution was rewritten, 
considerably modifying the incentives of political actors; in fact, different versions of a mixed 
electoral system were used for the legislative elections of 1993, 1998 and 2000. In 1993, 60 
percent of the deputies were elected by closed and blocked list, while the remaining 40 percent 
were elected in single-member plurality districts. In 1998, the rules were changed again to elect 
50 percent of the deputies by list and the other 50 percent in multimember plurality districts of 
varying magnitude. In 1999, in the elections of the Constituent Assembly, the constitutional 
mandate to use a proportional formula was completely abandoned in favor of a majoritarian 
system in statewide (and one national) multi-member districts to elect all the representatives.
32 In 
the 2000 legislative elections, the mixed system was readopted, but this time with 35 percent 
deputies elected by list and 65 percent in multimember plurality districts. 
These institutional reforms contributed to the erosion of the strict control that party 
leaders exercised over nomination procedures. This in turn weakened party discipline in the 
Legislature. In addition, the lack of a stable electoral system did not help to consolidate electoral 
incentives, increasing the levels of uncertainty that politicians faced when building their careers. 
                                                 
32 In each district multiple seats were awarded to the candidates who individually received more votes. 
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It is possible to distinguish two distinct sub-periods in terms of presidential powers during the 
period 1989-2004. In 1989-1998, presidents were weak. In contrast, since the approval of the 
1999 Constitution, the presidency has gained considerable power. In 1989, presidential powers 
were substantially reduced with the introduction of the direct election of governors and mayors. 
Presidents lost control over part of the budget (the constitutional allotment to the regions) and 
over the discretionary appointment and dismissal of governors, which had been a potent 
negotiation tool. In addition, the decline in oil fiscal income and the market-oriented reforms, 
which limited discretionary subsidies and reduced rent-seeking opportunities, also reduced the 
political currency of presidents (Villasmil et al., 2004).   
Due to the decline in presidential power, the executive branch in the 1990s had less 
influence in the legislative process. In the first period, close to 90 percent of all legislation was 
initiated by the executive. In contrast, in the second period, this figure declined to 74 percent. In 
terms of ordinary laws, the executive initiated only 38 percent, compared to 78 percent in the 
previous period (see Figure 3).  
In 1998, Congress for the first time approved the separation of legislative and presidential 
elections, with elections to be held that year. Congressional elections were set to coincide instead 
with regional and local elections, held a few weeks before the presidential elections. This 
modification was designed by the traditional parties to reduce the coattail effects that a potential 
landslide-victory by Chávez might produce on the legislature. Instead, the parties planned to 
build their support in Congress based on the strength of their regional governments (and the 
regional authorities’ coattails). As a result, these legislative elections generated the largest 
political fragmentation in Venezuela’s history (more than six effective parties). Moreover, the 
separation of legislative and presidential elections will be the norm in the future, since the 1999 
Constitution set a five-year legislative term and a six-year presidential term. 
In contrast to the previous constitution, the 1999 Constitution significantly increased 
presidential legislative prerogatives.
33 Most significantly, the president was given the power to 
call for popular referendums to approve or eliminate laws, approve constitutional reforms, or call 
for a Constitutional Assembly with plenipotentiary powers, all of which significantly 
                                                 
33 According to the methodology used by Payne et al. (2002), Venezuela is now around the Latin American average 
in terms of presidential legislative prerogatives. 
  43strengthened the executive’s bargaining power. As a by-product, the Constitution is now 
extremely easy to change if the executive is willing to do so and has the necessary popular 
support. This might present a challenging problem in the future for reconsolidating democracy 
and the rule of law in Venezuela. In addition, the presidential term was increased to six years 
(from five) and one immediate re-election was permitted. As a result, a Venezuelan president 
may rule for a longer continuous period (12 years) than any other Latin American president (the 
regional median is five years). 
Finally, changes in the party system, particularly the fragmentation and emergence of less 
cohesive and disciplined parties, have undermined the partisan powers of the president. In the 
first period, three of the six presidents (50 percent) had a partisan majority in the lower house. 
Four out of six had majorities in coalition with other parties. In contrast, since 1988, no 
administration has had a presidential party majority and only one administration has had a 
majority coalition with other parties (Chávez). This situation has increased the confrontations 
between the Legislature and the Executive branch. 
4.4  The Rise of Federalism 
Although Venezuela was formally federal for more than a century, it was only in 1989, after the 
initiation of the direct elections of governors and mayors, that the dormant federal system was 
activated. There are two key institutional elements of Venezuela’s federalism that transformed its 
party politics: the increasing competition and higher number of electoral arenas at the sub- 
national level, and the possibility of re-election for governors and mayors, as well as the non-
concurrency between regional and presidential elections. These institutional features provided 
new regional political actors with an opportunity to gain independence vis-à-vis the national 
authorities.  
4.4.1 Increasing Competition and Higher Number of Electoral Arenas  
During the 1958-1988 period, entry barriers were relatively high since presidential and 
congressional elections were held concurrently, maximizing presidential coattails. Moreover, 
entry into Congress was decided by national party leaders, who had control over the 
nominations. Instead, with the introduction of the direct election of governors and mayors, 
traditional political parties characterized by hierarchical and inflexible organizations had to 
present individual candidates in more than 20 states and 300 municipalities. This meant that 
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order to effectively compete in these contests. Increasing the number of electoral arenas also 
implied reducing the entry barriers to competition. Minority parties attempting to win elections at 
the national level could now compete more effectively at the regional and local levels. These 
parties could build their organization at the national level based on their success at the regional 
level.  
During this period, several new political parties, such as Causa R, Proyecto Venezuela, 
Convergencia-Lapi, MVR, PPT and Primero Justicia used federalism as a springboard to enter 
into the political system and build a national party organization. In the first election for 
governors in 1989, the AD and COPEI largely dominated the electoral market (90 percent of the 
governorships). However, during the following elections their dominance waned as new political 
organizations emerged and decentralized parties such as MAS obtained significant power for the 
first time. By 1998, the AD dominated only 34.7 percent of the governorships, COPEI 21.7 
percent. MAS 13 percent, MVR 17.7 percent and regional parties 12.9 percent (see Figure 7). 
One illustrative example of how political careers were built in this period is the rise of 
Andrés Velásquez and his party, Causa R, which had been a marginal party in the previous 
period. He was able to build the party starting with his victory as governor of the state of Bolivar 
in 1989. His effective performance allowed Velásquez to compete in the presidential elections of 
1993 and receive 22 percent of the vote. Causa R continued its success by later winning the 
mayoralty of Caracas in 1992 and the governorship of Zulia in 1996. Another example is 
Henrique Salas Römer, the governor of Carabobo, Venezuela’s largest industrial state: He first 
won the governorship with the support of the COPEI in 1989. He later abandoned the party due 
to internal disputes with its national leadership and created a regional party in 1995 called 
Proyecto Carabobo, which was later relabeled Proyecto Venezuela when he decided to run for 
the presidency in 1998. Primero Justicia entered the political scene by winning in the well-off 
municipalities of eastern Caracas. 
The multiplication of electoral arenas not only provided an incentive for some political 
parties to pursue an electoral strategy aligned with regional interests, it also forced national 
parties to use alliances with other political organizations to compete effectively in these different 
arenas. National political parties became increasingly dependent on party alliances between 1989 
and2000. The AD established alliances with an average of 2.2 parties in the regions where it was 
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2000, the AD had to establish alliances with an average of 6 parties to win just 12.5 percent of 
the governorships (see Figure 8). However, the AD’s reliance on these alliances, in terms of the 
average percentage of votes that these parties added to their candidates, was relatively low. In 
contrast, the COPEI was very dependent on these alliances to win. The average percentage of 
votes contributed by other parties supporting the COPEI’s gubernatorial candidates increased 
from 7.1 percent in 1989 to 40.3 percent in 2000. Even parties that as newcomers were able to 
win the presidency, such as President Chávez’s MVR, used alliances to win regional elections. In 
1998, the MVR allied on average with 8 parties and the alliances provided them with 18.3 
percent of the votes. In 2000, the MVR allied on average with 9 parties, receiving 9.7 percent of 
the votes from other partners. This same trend holds true for parties such the MAS, Proyecto 
Venezuela, and Causa R. One important consequence of the emergence of these alliances is that 
incumbent governors could shift partners more easily to assure re-election. As the importance of 
the alliances increased, the independence of incumbent governors also increased, allowing them 
to break with the party that initially supported them or to negotiate in more favorable terms with 
national party leaders.  
 
4.4.2 Re-Election and Non-Concurrent Elections 
The immediate re-election of governors and mayors in contests that were organized separately 
from national elections also increased the independence of these political actors. Governors and 
mayors running for re-election had greater opportunity to distance themselves from national 
party leaders and even disassociate themselves from the party structure. The fact that their re-
election depended to a great extent on their performance—and not on coattails from presidential 
candidates backed by centralized parties—created incentives for governors to behave more 
independently. In fact, governors quickly used their fiscal and administrative resources to control 
and expand existing local party machinery. During the 1992 gubernatorial contests, 18 
incumbents ran for re-election and eight managed to win. In 1995, only three governors could 
run as incumbents and two of them were re-elected. In 1998, 17 incumbents out of 21 governors 
were re-elected. In 2000, 15 governors were up for re-election and five of them obtained it. Intra-
party politics in this period revolved around the conflict between the new regional leaders and 
the old party leadership. In 1993, regional leaders were able to win the presidential nominations 
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of Zulia), in confrontation with the traditional leadership. Again in 1998, Irene Saéz, the 
independent mayor of Chacao, won the COPEI’s nomination, but in exchange the party 
controlled most legislative nominations.  
In sum, the introduction of re-election for governors and mayors and the fact that they 
were elected on a separate basis from their national counterparts created incentives for these new 
political actors to gain independence and challenge their party bosses. The federalization of 
Venezuelan politics also implied that these governors, in the context of a decaying party system 
and the deepening of the decentralization process, could build their own political organizations to 
support their careers. The re-election rule also fostered internal conflicts between party 
authorities at the national level and new party leaders at the regional and local levels. These 
tensions remained unresolved and on occasion forced regional players to separate themselves 
from their parties. In this sense, federalism enacted a dual dynamic: the formation of new 
regional political parties and the split-off from hierarchical political parties such as the AD, 
COPEI and MVR. 
4.5 The Judiciary 
The fragmentation of the party system and the decline in party discipline during the period 1989-
2003 undermined the strong grasp that national party barons exercised over the judicial system. 
Increasing civil society demands for expanded access to justice and judicial independence 
received support from the Supreme Court. With the assistance of the World Bank, the 
modernization of the Court was initiated. The Court assumed a more politically autonomous and 
activist role. The increasing judicial independence of the Court can be illustrated by its leading 
role in the impeachment of President Pérez in 1992 and by its many rulings—to resolve conflicts 
over elections—that negatively affected the largest parties (the AD and COPEI).  
Despite the changes that occurred in the early 1990s in the judicial system, the perception 
of judicial independence is today very low (World Competitiveness Report, 2002). During the 
Chávez presidency, the government has generally controlled the Court, which was originally 
appointed by the Constituent Assembly using the overwhelming government majority. 
Moreover, in 2004 the Chavista majority in the Legislature passed a new Supreme Tribunal law, 
adding new magistrates in order to obtain a firm grip on Tribunal decisions. This effectively 
ended any remaining independence on the part of the highest court. 
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From Cooperative Distribution of Oil Rents to Crisis and Instability 
 
The outer features of Venezuela’s democratic public policies have experienced significant 
transformations through time that can be linked to the combined effect of changes in the 
policymaking process and changes in exogenous conditions (mainly oil income). The first 15 
years (1958-1973) were characterized by cooperation, stability and effective performance. The 
next 15 years (1974-1988) of oil boom and bust were characterized by less cooperation, 
infectiveness and some inflexibility. The last 15 years (1989-2003) have been characterized by 
the marked decline and final breakdown of cooperation, policy instability, and reform reversal.  
 
5.1 1958-1973: Cooperation with a Relatively Stable Oil Market 
From 1958 to 1973, there were features of public policies that suggested effective inter-temporal 
cooperation among policy actors. Economic and social policies were relatively stable and 
bipartisan. Health and education coverage were rapidly expanded. Import substitution 
industrialization advanced with government financing. Oil policy was consensual and economic 
performance was very good. 
According to Hausmann (1990), Venezuela’s economic management during this period 
was characterized by three simple, stable and coherent rules geared toward inducing economic 
growth and minimizing political conflicts: 1) the fixed nominal exchange rate rule, allowing a 
significant degree of real exchange rate stability and reducing uncertainty; 2) the fixed nominal 
interest rate rule; and 3) the fiscal rule: spend what you earn (in oil revenue). Hausmann (1995) 
explained the conservative fiscal rule of the period as: “The fiscal rule according to which 
‘government spends according to its earnings’ has two sides. First, the most salient, is to limit 
public expenditure according to level of ordinary revenue, which substantially decrease the 
possibility of financing the fiscal deficit. In this sense, it is a balanced budget rule. Second, the 
rule emphasizes how much the government can spend and not how much it has to earn. The rule 
says that if oil income decreases, the government has to decrease public expenditure and not 
increase internal taxation. The society granted the State a license to spend according to the oil 
income. There is no license to increase internal taxation or to monetize the fiscal deficit.”  
These rules were effectively maintained through the first three presidential terms. The 
stability of the rules reflected cooperation rather than stringent legal or constitutional 
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fiscal opportunism. Inflation was kept strictly under control, averaging 2.6 percent per year and 
the exchange rate remained fixed until 1983. In addition, public expenditures were systematically 
geared toward improving health and education services and infrastructure, which was consistent 
with the long-term goal of providing the political system and the economy with a sound basis. 
For instance, from 1957 to 1973, the average enrollment per year in primary, secondary and 
university education increased 6.4 percent, 14.2 percent and 18.2 percent, respectively. 
Analogously, education expenditure (as a share of the total budget of the government) increased 
from 4.5 percent in 1957 to 18.6 percent in 1973 (Echevarría, 1995).   
The remarkable stability of theses policies was clearly related to the workings of the 
policymaking process, which induced a long-term cooperative agreement geared to minimizing 
political conflicts, and to the special characteristics of the economy and the external 
environment, which provided the favorable conditions necessary for the policies’ longevity. 
Regarding the latter, it is important to note that the rules were set on the assumption that oil 
income was going to be a relatively stable and increasing source of revenue for the government. 
In fact, during the period 1958-1973, oil fiscal revenues were smoothly increasing at an average 
rate of 5.5 percent per year (Santos, 2003). The gold-dollar-based international exchange rate 
system and the limited movement in international capital also provided an environment in which 
the rules could work. The internal coherence of the policies adopted during this period resulted in 
a good economic performance. From 1958 to 1973, GDP per capita experienced a relatively high 
rate of growth, averaging 2.1 percent per year. The unemployment rate decreased from 10.8 
percent in 1959 to 4.94 percent in 1973.
34 
5.2  1973-1989: Cooperation in the Midst of Oil Booms and Busts 
The increase in oil prices from 1973 to 1977 marks a change from the previous period because it 
allowed an outstanding increase in the expenditure possibilities of the government (in 1974 
alone, for example, there was a 165 percent increase in fiscal revenue), which in turn 
dramatically distorted the policy choices of Venezuela’s governments. 
During the first Pérez administration (1974-1979), oil revenues were used to finance an 
ambitious plan of development based on the nationalization of the oil and iron industries, the 
                                                 
34 Source: Banco Central de Venezuela. 
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subsidies. In general these were much more ambitious extensions of previous policies. 
Nevertheless, the increase in fiscal revenue promoted a departure from the previous fiscal 
conservatism, according to which government expenditure is limited to the income received 
during the period. In his first year in office, President Pérez created a fund to set apart a 
significant fraction of the extraordinary fiscal revenue for long-term investments. It soon 
vanished and the Pérez administration not only spent the extraordinary fiscal revenue, but also 
used its favorable position in the international banking system to increase the external debt 
position of the country (from $600 MM in 1973 to $10.800 MM in 1977). Another effect of the 
expansion of government was a considerable exacerbation of corruption. National party leaders 
were worried that Pérez was trying to construct an independent personal political base rather than 
working for the party-based structure that had worked in the previous 15 years. In summary, 
Pérez took advantage of the positive external shock to promote his particular agenda (a deviation 
from cooperation), but within the general principles of the cooperative agreement. In addition, 
the change in exogenous economic conditions (increase in oil income) and the resulting larger 
influence of public expenditures in the political system promoted a new set of policies geared 
toward generating private benefits for key political actors.  
Even though the decline of oil revenue during the late 1970s showed the economic 
vulnerabilities of this set of policies, there were some elements that induced politicians to avoid 
economic reform and maintain the significant distortions during the following two presidential 
terms. First, political actors could reasonably expect that the decline in oil revenue was 
transitory. Second, the main political actors considered that structural adjustment would 
undermine the foundations of the political system, given that expenditure policies were directly 
geared toward benefiting the main constituencies of the political parties. As a consequence, the 
balanced budget rule was abandoned for a relatively high level of public expenditure (using 
external debt to finance negative external shocks). Later on, in 1983, the government was forced 
to abandon the fixed exchange rate (which was replaced by an exchange control system that 
lasted until 1989). 
Although during the Herrera (1979-1983) and Lusinchi (1984-1988) Administrations 
some policies were changed because of the deterioration of economic conditions, it is remarkable 
how both administrations systematically tried to avoid any short-term negative distributive 
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fundamental and common feature of policies during this period was a clear aversion to political 
conflict, which translated into the use of oil income as an instrument to decrease social tensions. 
The side effect of this approach was the multiplication of fragmented policies resulting in a lack 
of coordination and long-term sustainability, as well as ineffectiveness. 
From the early 1980s to today, per capita oil fiscal income has had a declining tendency 
with high volatility. In contrast with the previous performance, Venezuela became one of the 
most striking cases of economic underperformance in Latin America after 1978. Between 1978 
and 1988, the growth rate of the GDP per capita became very volatile and decreased an average 
of 1.8 percent per year. 
5.3 1989-2004: Decline and Breakdown of Cooperation 
From 1988 to today there has been a decline in cooperation, and policy goals have become 
contradictory and highly volatile. The second Pérez Administration (1989-1993) tried to 
implement a systematic reform program. The reforms were geared toward promoting the 
development of a market economy by correcting the distortions accumulated during the previous 
decade. The drastic change in the orientation of public polices was a clear departure from those 
of the previous three decades. The administration faced the open rejection of its policy proposals 
by the most important political actors (including the governing party, the AD). Public disputes 
between the executive and the legislature were common, and some crucial reforms were not 
allowed to pass in Congress (e.g., tax reform). Venezuela was one of the few Latin American 
countries in which the initial reformer was politically defeated and reforms were reversed 
(Villasmil et al., 2004).  
President Caldera’s (1994-1999) electoral campaign was based on an open rejection of 
the market reforms. The advent of a massive banking crisis in 1995 allowed the Legislature to 
grant special decree powers to President Caldera. He used them to re-establish most economic 
controls. By 1996, the deterioration in economic conditions forced Caldera to undertake some 
reforms. The main policy measures included a partial opening of the oil sector to private 
investment, an increase in gasoline prices, and an increase in the VAT rate. In order to obtain 
support for these reforms, public sector wages were increased 117 percent. In addition, total 
transfers to local and regional governments increased by 2.25  percentage points of the GDP, due 
to an increase in revenue earmarking.  
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once again. Policies have become more volatile partially as a result of political instability. There 
has been a reversal of many reforms implemented during the previous administrations. Cabinet 
turnover has significantly increased. Governance and institutional quality has notoriously 
declined. 
5.4 Overall Quality of Public Policies 
From 1988 to today, abundant evidence exists that suggests an increasing deterioration in the 
quality of public policies, not only compared to the previous periods, but also compared to the 
performance of other Latin American countries during the same period. For example, the relative 
position of Venezuela in the different components of the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 
reveals that the country is one of the worst performers in the world in areas related to public 
policy outcomes. In the 2002 survey, Venezuela held among the lowest positions in the national 
business environment index (72 out of 80 countries), public institutions index (73), contract and 
law sub-index (77) and macroeconomic stability (77). These results are consistent with a 
situation in which it has become increasing difficult to achieve inter-temporal agreements among 
policymakers.  
The Word Bank Institute’s Governance Indicators also reflect the low and declining 
quality of Venezuela’s policies and institutions. In all six indicators, Venezuela has declined 
between 1996 and 2002. In the Political Instability index, Venezuela is in the 17 percent range 
(percentile), while the Latin American average is 48 percent.
35 In the index of Government 
Effectiveness, Venezuela has declined from 24 percent to 10 percent, while the regional average 
has been above 40 percent. In Regulatory Quality, the indicator has fallen from 45 percent to 35 
percent, while the regional average has been above 50 percent. In the Rule of Law index, 
Venezuela has fallen from the 29 percent percentile to 13 percent, while the regional average has 
been above 40 percent. Finally, in the Control of Corruption index, there is again a decline from 
28 percent to 19 percent.    
Eduardo Lora’s Structural Reform Index indicates that Venezuela has had one the poorest 
performances in the region in terms of the advancement of reform. In fact, Venezuela has been 
systematically below the Latin American average during the period 1985-1999. 
                                                 
35 There are almost 200 countries in the database. The percentile rank reflects the percentage of countries that did 
worse in the indicator than the case studied. 
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in the 1958-1988 period, Cabinet members lasted an average of 2.13 years in their positions (in a 
five-year term). Similarly, there were 2.3 ministers per Cabinet position per term. In contrast, 
from 1989 to 1993, ministers lasted only 1.4 years, increasing to 1.8 years from 1994-1999, and 
declining again to 1.3 years in the 1999-2004 period. That dramatic change in Cabinet stability 
reflects political instability and volatile policies.  
5.4.1 Features of Specific Policies 
In order to evaluate the features of Venezuela’s public policies some characteristics of two 
crucial policy areas, fiscal policy and public administration policy, are evaluated. Later, two 
additional areas, decentralization policy and oil policy, are briefly discussed. 
Fiscal Policy 
Since some elements of fiscal policy have already been discussed in the previous sub-section, 
here just a few additional elements are briefly discussed. In particular, the volatility and 
ineffectiveness of fiscal policy in the second period is illustrated.  
As explained, oil wealth management through fiscal policy during the first 15 years of 
democracy had some remarkable features that suggested inter-temporal cooperation among 
political actors (Hausmann, 1995). From 1958 to 1973, there were no episodes of significant 
fiscal deficit and public debt remained at very low levels. Increased public expenditure was 
directly related to increased oil fiscal revenue. Non-oil fiscal taxation remained relatively low 
and stable. Public spending priorities were clearly geared toward infrastructure health and 
education services, and toward promoting the industrialization of the country through an import-
substitution strategy.  
The use of oil to finance the government was a relatively costless alternative for political 
actors, because it produced a high flow of income by taxing a very narrow group of economic 
agents through a relatively simple administrative structure. In contrast, in order to obtain an 
equivalent flow of non-oil revenue, the government needed a substantially larger base of taxation 
and a more complex administrative structure. Therefore, the latter alternative was particularly 
unattractive given the objective of minimizing social tensions. In addition to the remarkable 
stability and coherence of the fiscal policy during this period, there are indications of its 
flexibility to adapt to changes in exogenous conditions. One example is provided by the 
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real oil price.  
The oil crisis of 1973, with the subsequent increase in oil prices, is clearly another 
defining moment in Venezuela’s fiscal history. During the 1970s, the conditions of the 
international oil market provided the government with an average level of oil revenue that was 
3.5 times that of the previous decade. In addition, oil prices also became very erratic, increasing 
the volatility of fiscal revenue during the late 1970s and the 1980s. The response of the Pérez, 
Herrera and Lusinchi Administrations was to deviate from the fiscal discipline of the previous 
period, running large deficits and acquiring a significant amount of foreign debt in order to 
finance policies based on relatively high levels of public expenditures. However, during the 
period 1958-1986, the relatively low level of modifications to the presidential budget proposals 
in the legislature seems to illustrate that there was significant cooperation in fiscal policy 
(Puente, 2003b). 
Fiscal Policy in the Second Period: 1989-2004 
By 1989, fiscal problems were acute. The second Pérez Administration presented a fiscal reform 
program to correct the fiscal imbalances, proposing a tax reform to increase non-oil revenue and 
a stabilization fund to reduce fiscal volatility. However, as explained in the previous section, the 
policymaking process had become less cooperative, so these reforms were blocked in Congress. 
In addition, the Gulf War produced an influx of oil revenue that reduced the urgency of fiscal 
reforms. As a result, the structural fiscal deficit continued.  
In the following years, fiscal policy continued to lack cooperative features. The most 
important tax reform that could finally be approved was the value-added tax law (VAT), which 
was accepted under extremely exceptional political circumstances. It passed into law during the 
1992-1993 interim presidency of Ramón Velásquez, after two coup attempts and the 
impeachment of Pérez. However, in order to obtain the legislative support necessary to pass the 
law, a large share of the VAT revenue had to be earmarked for a special fund to finance the 
investments of regional governments (FIDES). For the first time in Venezuela’s history, 
governors and mayors had become a powerful force in the national legislature, a sign of times to 
come. Moreover, in his first year in office, President Caldera reduced the VAT while 
maintaining the FIDES. By 1996, the extreme adversity of the fiscal and economic problems 
(due to the banking crisis) forced the Executive to adopt a program of adjustment, which 
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opening of the oil sector to foreign investment. Once again, an increase in oil prices in 1996 
allowed the government to increase fiscal expenditure and halt other reforms. The favorable 
conditions in the oil market did not last long, however, and by late 1997 and early 1998, fiscal 
conditions were again deteriorating.  
State governors continued to influence fiscal policy during these years. In particular, in 
late 1996, new legislation established a minimum level of transfers (about 15-20 percent) from 
the VAT revenue to FIDES and, at the beginning of 1998, the Legislature approved a law in 
which a share of oil royalties had to be transferred to the states. 
Even though an effective tax reform has been elusive, tax policy has been very volatile. 
Since 1992 the income tax law has been reformed five times, the value-added tax nine times, and 
the tax on banking transactions has been “temporarily” established four times (Briceño, 2002). 
Similarly, Puente (2003b) found that the activity of Congress in the budgetary process, measured 
by the average absolute difference of congressional changes to the Executive’s budget for each 
year, increases substantially from 1986 onward. In the period 1973-1985, Congress usually 
approved the budget presented by the government with relatively few changes. However, in the 
period between 1986 and 1998, only three annual appropriations involved changes of less than 5 
percent percent, six involved changes of more than 26 percent, and one more of than 36 percent. 
In this sense, it is possible to identify two different patterns of congressional activity in the 
period: one characterized by a low level of congressional involvement in the budget process 
(1973-1985) and another with a high level of involvement (1986-1999).  
Public Administration and Bureaucracy 
Even though there has never been an effective civil service system in Venezuela, the evidence 
seems to point to the fact that in the first three administrations of the democratic era, the quality 
of bureaucracy was significantly better than its quality in the last two decades. In 1960, during 
the Betancourt administration, the Public Administration Commission (CAP) was created with 
the assistance of the United Nations. The CAP recommended the enactment of the 
Administrative Career Law and the creation of the Central Personnel Office. Both reforms were 
aimed at creating the institutional basis for the professionalization of the civil service. Politicians 
in Congress blocked attempts to pass the reforms suggested by the CAP. During the coalition 
governments of Betancourt and Leoni, all political parties in the Punto Fijo Pact wanted to carry 
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public administration to an autonomous civil service (COPRE, 1990). President Betancourt used 
his executive decree powers in 1960 to pass a regulation on Government Personnel. Although 
this regulation provided a minimum legal framework to govern public servants, it reflected a lack 
of long-term commitment to a civil service policy.  In 1965, President Leoni passed some 
guidelines that would regulate the human resources system on some issues such as hiring, 
transferences, dismissals, promotions and salary raises. In 1968, Rafael Caldera (COPEI) won 
the election, having a minority in Congress. The AD, now out of power but with a large presence 
in Congress, decided to approve the Administrative Career Law to create a civil service and limit 
the Executive’s power over the bureaucracy. During the period 1958-1973, although there was 
no political commitment to create a professional civil service, the bureaucracy worked relatively 
well in terms of its capacity to respond to or cope with the population’s needs. The coverage of 
the public services was considerably expanded and the foundations of some model organizations, 
such as the Central Bank and the National Library, were established. 
Paradoxically, even with the civil service law, the bureaucracy began a process of 
progressive decline after 1973. The goals of the law were distorted and it was reduced to being a 
guarantee of job stability for public employees. Political party affiliation was the principle 
criterion used to determine entry, and for the first time salaries were not adequate enough to 
attract qualified people into the civil service. There was virtually no performance evaluation for 
civil servants, and the process of training was totally set aside. During Pérez’s first 
administration, the central government grew significantly. The number of ministries increased 
from 13 to 17, and there was also a tremendous growth in the decentralized public 
administration.
36  
However, the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976 and the creation of the state-
owned oil monopoly (PDVSA) showed a long-term commitment to the company’s autonomy 
and efficiency. Similarly, other pockets of efficiency were maintained, for example, in the 
Central Bank and in some state-owned companies (such as Edelca, a large hydroelectric 
generator, and the Caracas Metro).  
                                                 
36 According to Bigler (1981), 163 new entities were created; this is 2.86 times more created entities than in any 
other government since Juan Vicente Gómez in 1928. 
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study political and institutional reforms. In 1989, the COPRE presented a proposal for Public 
Administration reform. It was based on a diagnosis of two main dysfunctions: the spoils system 
and excessive centralization. The spoils system was based on the government’s use of oil fiscal 
revenue to distribute particular benefits (positions, scholarships, contracts, subsidies) among its 
partisans. These benefits also included entry into a stable job within the public administration. 
Loyalty and submission, rather than meritocracy, were the basis of the bureaucracy. There were 
the important exceptions mentioned above: the PDVSA, the Central Bank, etc.
37 They relied on a 
totally different human resources notion based on merits, continued assessment and education. 
Politics had little or nothing to do with the selection and compensation of an employee. In fact, 
in these institutions, human resource management was generally conducted under special 
regulations that allowed them to bypass the public administration procedures. 
In the second period, 1989-2004, public administration performance declined 
significantly, even though some significant reforms were implemented in the early 1990s to try 
to reverse its progressive deterioration. Those reforms included: 
 
1)  A new salary scale with better pay for the top positions, closer to their opportunity 
cost. Increasing the wage ratio of top salaries over minimum salaries to 16. 
2)  Structural reforms in a few public organizations such as the Tax Authority (SENIAT) 
and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIC). In those cases, competitive 
compensation and career development were reinforced in order to attract and 
maintain qualified personnel. 
3)  The creation of independent technical advisory offices in Congress and the Ministry 
of Finance. The creation of these organizations was tied to loans given to the 
Venezuelan government by the Inter-American Development Bank. 
4)  A new law for the Central Bank of Venezuela that strengthened its autonomy and 
eliminated the corporatist nature of its board of directors. The appointment of the 
president of the Bank by the Executive began to require congressional ratification 
(with a two-thirds majority). 
 
                                                 
37 The BCV has been described as an example of successful public sector human resource management (Reid and 
Scott, 1994). 
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ratio was 6 (González, 2002). The SENIAT and the MIC are displaying the same features of the 
rest of the bureaucracy. The technical advisory offices have been disbanded. The pockets of 
efficiency mentioned before (the PDVSA, the Central Bank, the Caracas Metro, etc.) have had a 
significant decline in their meritocracy and autonomy. After the oil industry strike (December 
2002-January 2003), roughly 18,000 workers were dismissed. As a consequence, PDVSA crude 
oil production has declined from 2.3 to 1.6 millions of barrels per day. The Central Bank faces 
strong political pressure ,and President Chavez has threatened to fire its board members unless 
they respond to government requests. 
The above characterization of the civil service policy shows that political parties have to 
a large degree used public employment as a distributive mechanism throughout the democratic 
period. During the first years of democracy, the government’s priority was political stability and 
not economic efficiency. Consequently, this explains why there was practically no effort to build 
the foundations of a real civil service system. However, during those years, it was possible to 
satisfy both political objectives (higher support to political parties and democracy) and social-
economic objectives. The population’s needs and demands were very simple, and the oil windfall 
proved to be more than enough to meet those requirements.  
During the first three administrations, some of the best professionals in the country were 
civil servants. At the time salaries were competitive. One of the most important reasons for the 
decline of the Venezuelan bureaucracy has been the significant decline of public servant salaries 
relative to private sector salaries (i.e. the opportunity cost). In 1965, public sector salaries were 
on average more than 2.3 times the average private sector salary. In the 1970s this ratio declined 
to less than 2 and became very volatile. By the mid-1990s, the ratio was less than 1 (Baptista, 
2001). Part of the explanation for the dramatic erosion of public sector salaries has to do with the 
huge expansion in public sector employment that occurred during the oil booms. After oil 
revenues declined it was difficult to cut back personnel or nominal wages. However, real wages 
in the public sector suffered a dramatic decline. 
According to the Appointment Strategy Index developed by Geddes (1994), Venezuelan 
governments from Betancourt to Lusinchi undertook a compartmentalization strategy that was 
characterized by: 
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competence and loyalty. 
B.  Informal meritocratic recruitment and promotion based on performance in agencies the 
president deems most crucial to his program. 
C.  Recruitment of rest of bureaucracy through customary patronage channels controlled by 
the president, party, and coalition partners. 
 
Geddes (1994) gave the first three democratic presidential administrations an index of 5 
(where 0 represents pure patronage and 10 pure meritocracy). In contrast, the index declined to 
an average of 3.66 for the next three administrations. Then it increased during Pérez’s second 
administration to 7 (the last one covered in the study). Taking into account the low scores 
recently obtained by the Venezuelan bureaucracy in the World Bank Governance indicators (in 
the 10
th percentile) as well as others (e.g., the Global Competitiveness Report) mentioned above, 
the Chávez administration should probably be given a very low score in Geddes’ index. Chávez 
has had the most openly partisan selection strategy of any administration in Venezuela’s 
democratic history.  
It is important to note that in Geddes index Venezuela was either at the regional average 
or above it in terms of meritocracy. Only Brazil, Chile, and Peru (under Fujimori) received 
higher scores. In other words, in general, the Venezuelan bureaucracy used to be relatively 
similar in terms of its levels of meritocracy/patronage to those of other Latin American countries. 
However, today Venezuela is clearly at the bottom of the region. 
Decentralization Policy 
It can be argued that decentralization in Venezuela not only began belatedly in comparison with 
other Latin American countries, but also that is has been a very volatile policy. As a 
consequence, Venezuela has advanced in decentralizing its public sector, but has not moved as 
fast as other countries in the region. In addition, the process remains structurally fragile, 
especially in terms of its financial side, and is vulnerable to attempts to reverse it given the 
regions’ dependence on vertical intergovernmental transfers. 
Until the late 1980s, federalism in Venezuela was a legal formality. Under both 
authoritarian and democratic governments, the president appointed governors. It was only in 
1989 with the direct election of governors and mayors that a decentralization policy became a 
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destiny of the process depended largely on the preferences of politicians in charge of the 
government at the time. 
The decentralization policy experienced significant developments during Pérez’s second 
presidency. In 1989, several laws were enacted, providing a legal base for decentralization, and 
many competencies and resources were transferred. The provisional government of Ramón 
Velazquez (1993-1994) gave a greater push to decentralization. The FIDES, a fund for regional 
investment, was created with earmarked tax funds and a Ministry of Decentralization was 
created. In Caldera’s administration, decentralization slowed down. However, the governors still 
obtained additional resources from oil revenue through their influence in Congress. Finally, with 
Chávez, decentralization has been severely affected. The process leading to the transfer of 
concurrent competencies to the states has been blocked. However, Chávez still has not been able 
to fully re-centralize the policymaking process due to the power and significant political base of 
governors and mayors.
38   
Oil Policy 
Oil policy represents one of the most stable and cooperative policies in Venezuela’s democratic 
history, but such cooperation has not always brought welfare enhancing policies. From 1958 to 
1975, all governments systematically increased the taxation of the foreign-owned oil companies 
working in the country. Governments also provided incentives for rapidly increasing production, 
but at the same time did not renew oil concessions, setting the companies’ horizon in 1983. As a 
result, companies began to disinvest and exploited the oil fields already in production more 
intensively. A decade later, as could be expected, the lack of investment produced a decline in 
production.  
The cooperation of all the parties involved in the policy process to extract more resources 
from the oil companies was remarkably effective. However, its long-term effects were very 
negative. The specific nature of this sector—its high level of sunk costs—provides part of the 
explanation for this shortsighted behavior. It allowed politicians to postpone the costs of a 
predatory strategy for more than a decade. 
                                                 
38 In the regional elections of October 2004, Chavez’s party (MVR) won all but two of the governorships. This 
situation may allow the president to significantly re-centralize some areas of public decision-making. Health and 
police services are going to be re-centralized according to the current administration.  
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creation of the state-owned oil company, PDVSA, offers a remarkable example of a high degree 
of cooperation, this time with very positive consequences. The company was structured so as to 
minimize politicization and maintain operational and financial autonomy. As a result, it was the 
most efficient institution of the Venezuelan state.  
Oil policy continued being remarkably cooperative until the 1990s. The opening of the oil 
sector to foreign investment was supported by the AD and COPEI, but was radically opposed by 
Chávez. After winning the election, he eliminated the financial and operative autonomy of the 
PDVSA. A dramatic decline in the quality of the company has occurred. The breakdown in 
cooperation again is highly visible. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The analysis of the outer features of public policies in Venezuela tends to support the general 
hypothesis of the theoretical framework proposed by Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi (2003), namely 
that under conditions favorable for cooperation, such as those which prevailed in the first period 
(1958-1988), policies tend to have some desirable outer features such as stability and coherence. 
This conclusion is particularly evident if one compares the first period with the non-cooperative 
policymaking process that has prevailed in Venezuela in the last 15 years. In this second period, 
public policies have been increasingly unstable, incoherent, and shortsighted.  
In the first period, policies were relatively coherent, stable and bipartisan. Despite the 
alternation of two parties in power, in many areas policies could be characterized as state 
policies rather than governmental policies. Leading examples were foreign relations, oil policy, 
industrialization policy, education policy, and health policy. Fiscal policy was relatively well 
managed until the oil shocks of the 1970s significantly distorted the policy process. The 
bureaucracy was relatively effective, well paid, and stable in the first two decades, and even after 
the oil booms and busts, “pockets of efficiency” such as the PDVSA and the Central Bank were 
preserved. Oil policy was stable and coherent but shortsighted in the first two decades, although 
the creation of the PDVSA in 1976 reflected a high level of cooperation and long-term 
commitment among the political actors.  
In contrast, the second period has been characterized by high policy volatility and the 
lack of long-term policy commitments. Fiscal and tax policies have been erratic and inflation has 
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pockets of efficiency have been almost fully disbanded. Oil policy has been incoherent and 
short-sighted, and decentralization of public services has been volatile and incoherent.  
In the Venezuelan case it is clear that the cooperative policymaking process that 
prevailed in the first three decades of democracy was to a large extent the result of the 
institutional foundations that were deliberately put into place by the Pact of Punto Fijo. The 
Constitution significantly limited the stakes of power. This was especially relevant in a country 
where considerable stakes were involved in the control over oil revenue. In particular, 
presidential powers were significantly constrained relative to regional standards. The 
institutional framework also stimulated the existence of strong, centralized and disciplined 
political parties. In addition, some of its features reduced the fragmentation induced by a 
proportional electoral system. All these elements contributed toward generating a remarkably 
cooperative policymaking process.  
The dramatic decline in cooperation that has occurred in the last decade and a half can be 
partially attributed to the popular discontent generated by the poor economic performance of the 
1980s, which was largely due to the exogenous fall in oil fiscal revenue. Nevertheless, the 
institutional reforms of the late 1980s also contributed to changing the incentive structure of the 
polity, weakening the party system and making the policymaking process less cooperative. The 
election of regional authorities and the change in the electoral system weakened party discipline 
and promoted political fragmentation. Combined with the decline in oil fiscal revenue, these 
reforms also engendered a relatively weak executive branch.  
Using a “partial equilibrium” perspective, these institutional reforms should have 
produced only positive results and in fact from the perspective of the quality of public services 
and democratic accountability, they seem to have been quite effective (De la Cruz, 1998). A 
closed and centralized political system became more open, decentralized, and competitive. 
However, these reforms might have contributed to unraveling the cooperative equilibrium that 
had prevailed, without providing an alternative incentive structure to induce cooperation. In that 
sense, the “general equilibrium” perspective provided by Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi (2003) 
allows for a different take on the Venezuelan institutional reforms.  
Although during the first period the policymaking process showed remarkably 
cooperative features, it failed to deliver policies that promoted long-term growth or effectively 
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explainable. The optimal strategy for cooperative politicians might not entail advocating public 
policies that foster economic development if  those policies are detrimental to their political 
survival. For example, cooperation in some contexts might take the form of a political cartel to 
stay in power and exclude others from it. Moreover, in the case of governments financed by oil 
rents whose magnitude does not depend on the general quality of public policies, political 
cooperation might not necessarily imply efficiency.  
In the case of Venezuela, under the resource abundance provided by oil, the favorable 
conditions for cooperation seem to have fostered the creation of a political cartel devoted to 
distributing oil rents among political clients. The oil resources, and some of the institutions that 
fostered cooperation, also undermined the ability of new political competitors to enter into 
democratic contestation, representing high entry barriers. In other words, cooperation was 
collusive, limiting democratic competition. As a result, the cartel implemented policies that were 
unsustainable once oil rents declined, and due to its closed nature, it was slow to adapt to 
changes in the political environment, leading to its demise. 
In addition to the literature arguing that the poor economic performance of the last two 
decades in Venezuela and in other oil-exporting counties can be attributed largely to oil income 
decline and volatility; there exists a growing literature showing that a dependence on oil rents 
produces a strong tendency toward authoritarianism and institutional decay.
39 The causal 
mechanisms that produce this result are still debated. Among the leading hypotheses are: 1) the 
stakes of power are very high in oil-dependent societies, and control of the oil revenue generates 
a high prime for holding onto power; 2) oil dependence allows for low levels of non-oil taxation, 
which lead to a lack of accountability in the use of fiscal revenue and weaken the state’s 
administrative capacity; 3) oil resources can be spent on patronage, weakening the opposition 
and the rise of democratic pressures, 4) oil revenue can be used for repression; 5) since the state 
controls most resources, civil society and private entrepreneurs are less autonomous; and 6) oil 
rents generate a tendency toward corruption (Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001; Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003; Lam and Wantchekon, 2003; Isham et al., 2003). This literature provides a 
complementary explanation for the decline of the Punto Fijo democracy. One very simplified 
                                                 
39 Examples of the first literature are Hausmann and Rigobón, 2002; Manzano and Rigobón, 2001; Rodríguez and 
Sachs, 1999. The institutional literature includes Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003; 
Lam and Wantchekon, 2003; and Isham et al., 2003. 
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by significantly reducing the stakes of power, avoiding the authoritarian fate of other oil-
exporters and failed democracies in the region. However, the oil boom and following bust 
induced economic decline and institutional decay. The efforts to reform the economy and the 
political institutions contributed to the collapse of the political system by weakening the bases of 
the cooperative equilibrium that was in place.    
There exists also a significant political science literature stressing that the Venezuelan 
institutional framework of Punto Fijo lacked representativeness, accountability, and transparency 
(Karl, 1986; De la Cruz, 1998; Crisp, 2000). Karl (1986) argues that the transition to democracy 
based on elite pacts, such as Punto Fijo, can be successful in stabilizing democracy, but tends to 
produce exclusionary political systems. In the case of Venezuela, the radical left was deliberately 
left out of the elite pact. In the 1960s, these groups formed a significant guerrilla movement 
supported by Cuba. By the end of the decade the insurgency was defeated and most of its leaders 
became involved in political parties that got a small share of the vote. The restrictive nature of 
the political system was exacerbated after the oil boom and a two-party system emerged. 
According to this perspective, the “deficit of democracy” eventually led to the demise of the 
political system.   
From the perspective of theoretical framework developed by Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi 
(2003), it is interesting to note that in Latin America, with the exception of Costa Rica, the only 
three civilian regimes (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela) and two democracies (Colombia and 
Venezuela) that survived uninterruptedly since the 1950s, were regimes with limited 
competition. The three regimes generated policymaking systems that were rather cooperative and 
for a while achieved good performance, but eventually all faced problems of legitimacy and 
performance that led to institutional reforms that reduced the cooperative nature of the system. 
One interesting line of further research would be studying the relationship between the 
competitive characteristics of the political regime, the cooperation it induces in the policymaking 
process, and its long-run sustainability.  
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